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L E  CT U R E  S. 
D 
Friday, March 'nd, 1860. 
GENERAL Sra J. F. BURGOYNE, BART. G.C.B., in the Chair. 
THE R I F L E  A N D  THE R A N P A R T ;  O R ,  THE FUTURE OF 
DEFENCE.  
BY CAPTAIN H. W. TYLER, H.E. 
TIIERE are still ;L number of nice, dear, old ladies in this country-lo11g 
may they livc in it!-who consider steam engines and railways as nasty, 
dangerous things, who believe that people have no right to be whirled 
through the air at the awful speeds of the present day, and who are firmly 
resolved not to  place their wluable lives, at all events, a t  the disposal of 
any board 'of railway directors. I t  would answcr no good end, of course, 
to talk to these otherwise sensible persons, of the enormous results which 
these " newfangled machinations " have already produced, any more than 
of those which they i r e  destined to bring about, in the different relations 
of mankind. 
I n  like manner, there are many distinguished membcrs of the sterner sex, 
younger in years, and military by profession, who look through ;L veil of 
prejudice a t  the improvements which are taking place in the weapons of 
war. They cannot but consider rifled muskets and guns, and elongated 
projectiles, to, bc nasty dangerous things ; but they are convinced, nerer- 
theless, that they will not produce, after all, much alteration in the actual 
practice of war. They regrct to see such weapons being introduced into 
the service. They fear that the relations which have previously existed, 
and which ought in their opinion still to be maintained, between tho three 
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332 THE RIFLE AXD THE n,iarraItT; 
arms, arc in danger of being disturbed. They foresee that soldiers will be 
shooting at each other from long distances, and throwing away their ammu- 
nition, without achieving decisive results. I t  would be an equally thankless 
task to discuss with them the possible effects of these improvements, and 
still more so to dwell with them upon those interesting reflections, as to  the 
power which the possession of such means of destruction confers upon 
civilisation, and upon the helpless condition in which barbarism mill, in the 
end, be relatively placed. 
I cannot, of course, suppose that any person holding viem of this de- 
scription \Todd take the trouble to  come here to-day ; but I am happy now 
to have an opportunity of endeavouring to fulfil towards those who have 
done me the honour to attend, the promise which I made in this place on 
the 1st of April in lnst gear. 
There have been two great changes since that time in the military pro- 
spects of this country, for which v e  ha& to thank,-no apprehensions 
excited by vain threats or  empty menaces,-but the actual demonstrations 
and preparations of the Emperor, our neighbour. 
I took that opportunity of strongly advocating, as others had done before 
me, the establishment of volunteer corps; but I little thought how soon 
that movement mas to commence, which has since taken root, has sprung 
up, has shot its branches over the length and breadth of the land, and has 
already so abundantly brought forth fruit. 
But, as a general law of nature, rapid growth is followed by quick decay. 
A man forgets most readily that which he learns most easily; and values 
least what he acquires with the smallest difficulty. I n  vegetable, as  me11 
as  in animal nature, short endurance ,follows upon rapid growth, as an 
almost invariable rule. In the establishment of empires, or in the altera- 
tions of their constitutions, the same law holds good. And what we have 
principally to fear with regard to our rifle movement, is, that it  has come 
to us in a storm too violent to last, and that it will dwindle away after the 
occasion has passed away by which it was immediately called forth, There 
is not much fear of this, however, as long as the political horizon main- 
tains its present threatening aspect. A great point will have been gained, 
when once military organisation, military discipline, and proficiency in the 
use of the rifle, have acquired a firm footing in the civil ranks of life, and 
particularly when they are recognised as a itseful element in the education 
of the youth of the country. 
T h e  second measure that has been happily effected, is the appointment 
by the Government of a Royal Commission t o  consider and report upon the 
important question of National Defence. We are now anxiously expecting 
to have an opportunity of seeing the Report of that Commission, snd  of 
ascertaining how they propose to expend those ten millions of money which 
have been so much talked about. 
This is a large sum; but our Houses of Parliament have cost a quarter 
of it; the fortifications of Paris alone have been estimated to cost, altogether, 
8,000,000 pounds sterling; and if we can place ourselves, as far as our 
fortifications are concerned, in a condition of security for something ap- 
proaching to that amount, ~e shall do well. The prosperity of this country 
depends upon its commerce. The  parent of commerce is confidence. By 
a judicious system of permanent works, and by  a wise expenditure of 
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011, TIIC FUTURE OF DEFENCE. 333 
money amongst our own population, s e  may fairly expect to purchase a n  
irrcreased feeling of stability-with regard to our country and its institutions, 
a t  home and abroad, in time of peacc and in periods of war, which will have 
more than a money value; ne may hope to avoid those occasions of panic 
which have recently been too much in fashion amongst us ; and rie may feel 
confident, that there nil1 be an augmentation to the capital of the country, 
which will cause sucli a sum, great as it is, to appear even small by compa- 
rison. 
NOW, the expected possession of a force of 100,000 * effective volunteer 
riflemen and.artillerpen, and the probable expenditure of a large sum of 
money upon fortifications, have an important connection, both with our 
subject of t o d a y  and mith each other. Twelve months ago, it appeared to  
be useless, if not worsc than useless, to construct permanent works on ;I 
large scale for the defence of thc country. It was clear, that, in the event 
of an invasion, when they ~ o u l d  have been most required, we must mainly 
have garrisoned them a t  the expense of our army in the field, from which 
not a man could have been spared. A t  that time, when it appeared SO 
unlikely that we should obtain,, either the money required for the construc- 
tion of necessary works of defence, or the garrisons with which to man 
them, it was impossible to take that interest which we feel at present in the 
details of the question, 
W e  could not have 
better garrisons for our works than effective infantry and artillery volunteers ; 
and no better situation for the action of a proportion of these volunteers 
could be prescntcd, than behind the parapets which are about, we mill hope, 
to be constructed. In such positions, they Rould not only be themselves o f  
essential service, but they would also liberate nearly the whole of the 
regular troops and militia for  active service against the enemy. 
Seeing then, that there is now a fair prospect, both of works for the 
defence of the country and of garrisons to put into them, IYC may proceed, 
with a practical object in view, to  consider the principles upon which those 
works should be constructed. 
Ni l i ta r j  tactics and the science of fortification are alike dependent 
upon the wcapons employed. The former must always be guided in its 
rides of action, the latter in its principles of construction, by the effects 
of thosc weapons; but alterations in tactics may bc effected by degrees. 
I n  field operations, experience, however dearly bought, may be gradually 
acquired. A general who best foresees necessary changes, and troops who 
are best prepared for them, are no doubt possessed of great advantages, 
and must, ceteris pavihis, be in the first instance victorious; but still, 
commanders and troops may a11 learn from one another, and may more 
or less modify their movements and their operations, from time to time, 
according to  the lessons which they receive. 
With fortifications the case is different. The engineer is required at once 
to construct new works which shall be well adapted to future circumstances. 
IIe has nothing to guide him but his own studies and reflections, and such 
applications as he can make of the experience of the past to the probabilities 
of the future. IIc is called upon to lay out works which shall be available 
But circumstances have most materially changed. 
Since happily swelled to 160,000. and upwards. 
2 u 2  
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OR, THE FUTURE OF DEFENCE. 335 
they were 60 feet high, 15 feet above the walls. A t  Nineveh they were 
100 feet higher than the malls, and they measured altogether 200 feet from 
their bases to their summits. They were commonly 30 or 40 feet in 
diameter. 
At  Jerusalem, Carthage, Rhodes, and other places, double or triple walls 
were employed, for greater security; and a t  Ecbatana, the capital of the 
Medes, there were seven walls. T h e  o3ter one, two or three miles long, 
was white ; the second was black ; the third, purple ; the fourth, blue ; the 
fifth, red ; the sixth, silvered; and the seventh, gilded. Each of these was 
higher by its battlements than the one in front of it, and the whole must 
have furnished an astonishing example of luxury in fortification. 
I should not omit to mention here, also, the walls of Great Britain and 
China. 
T h e  former, 12 feet high and 8 feet thick, was constructed in the begin- 
ning of the third century. It was 74 miles long, with battlements 4 feet 
high, and was defended by means of I8 stations, about 4 miles apart, each 
accommodating 600 men ; 81 castles, less than a mile apart, each garrisoned 
by 100 men ; and 330 watch-towers, or turrets, each containing a few men. 
The latter, 20 feet high, and 14 feet thick, was built upwards of 400 years 
before. It was armed with towers 80 or 100 yards apart. Both of these 
tvalls were carried &rectly over all the obstacles that came in their way. 
I n  the middle ages, the ponderous machines of the ancients wera less used, 
though they were employed during the Crusades ; and there were no such 
fortresses constructed as we read of in the records of earlier times, either in 
point of extent or of solidity. Cologne, and modern Jerusalem, are the two 
best examples of niediyval fortification. The  walls of the former have been 
utilised in the works constructed in the present century, which now surround 
the city ; and they are familiar to the English tourist, as well as the castles 
on the Rhine, and in other places. I n  our own country there arc many ex- 
ceedingly interesting specimens of medisval fortification. Amongst them 
may be particularly mentioned the castles and walls, so rvell known, of Con- 
way, Carnarvon, and Ludlorv. The'first of these has rodnd, the second 
octagonal towers ; and the third is surrounded by t o m r s  of various forms. 
T h e  castles of Edinburgh and Stirling, like those of the Rhine, are remark- 
able for the sites on which they have been constructed. 
But, even now, there arc lessons to be learned, both from ancient and from 
mediacval fortification, which should not be despised. I n  modem fortresses, 
too much dependence has often been placed upon one defensive line, and the 
forcing of that one line has frequently led to  the capture, or surrender 
of the place. Unprovided, even with posts of security along that line, for- 
tresses have not only been lost, but the inhabitants have also been delivered 
over to the excesses of their infuriated assailants, on the occasion of B sur- 
prise, of a coup-de-main, or of the storming of a breach. 
The ancients provided against such a contingency, partly by rendering 
their towers independently defensible, and, still better, by the numbers of 
w d l s  which they constructed one within the other. The architects of the 
middle ages attained a similar object by their citadels and keeps, or by for- 
tifying the houses within the walls which surrounded their towns. 
The want of permanent internal works of an analogous description, also, 
has a u w d  the uwrender of many a fortress in modern times, after the for- 
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OR, THE FUTURE OF DEFENCE. 335 
they were 60 feet high, 15 feet above the walls. A t  Nineveh they were 
100 feet higher than the walls, and they measured altogether 200 feet from 
their bases to  their summits, They were commonly 30 or 40 feet in 
diameter, 
At Jerusalem, Carthagc, Rhodcs, and other places, double or triple walls 
were employed, for greater security; and at Ecbatana, the capital of the 
3Iedes, there mere seven walls. The outer one, tEo or three miles long, 
was white; the second was black ; the third, purple ; the fourth, blue ; the 
fifth, red ; the sixth, silvered; and the seventh, gilded. Each of these was 
higher by its bsttlements than the one in front of it, and the whole must 
have furnished an astonishing example of Iaxury in fortification. 
I should not omit to mention here, also, thc walls of Great Britain and 
China. 
T h e  former, 12 feet high and 8 feet thick, was constructed in  the begin- 
ning of the third century. It was 74 miles long, with battlements 4 feet 
high, and was defended by means of 18 stations, about 4 miles apart, each 
accommodating 600 men ; 81 castles, less than a mile apart, each gnrrisoned 
by 100 men ; and 330 watch-towers, or turrets, each containing a few men, 
The  latter, 20 feet high, and 14 feet thick, was built upwards of 400 years 
before. It was armed with towers 80 or 100 yards apart. Both of these 
walls were carried directly over all the obstacles that came in their way 
In  the middle ages, the ponderous machines of the ancients were less used, 
though they were employed during the Crusades ; and there were no such 
fortresses constructed ns w read of in the records of earlier times, either in 
point of extent or of solidity. Cologne, and modern Jerusalem, arc the two 
best examples of medimal fortification. The walls of the former have been 
utilised in the works constructed i n  the present century, which now surround 
the city ; and they arc familiar to the English tourist, as well as the castles 
on the Rhine, and in other places. I n  our own country there are many ex- 
ceedingly interesting specimens of mediaaval fortification. Amongst them 
may be particularly mentioned the castles and walls, so well known, of Con- 
way, Carnarvon, and Ludlox. The#first of these has round, the second 
octagonal towers ; and the third is surrounded by towers of various forms. 
T h e  castles of Edinburgh and Stirling, like those of the Rhine, are remark- 
able for the sites on which they have bccn constructed. 
But, even now, there are lessons to be learned, both from ancient and from 
mediaoval fortification, which should not be despised. In  modern fortresses, 
too much dependence has often bccn placed upon one defensive line, and the 
forcing of that one line has frequently led to the capture, or surrender 
of the place. Unprovided, even with posts of security along that line, for- 
tresses have not only been lost, but the inhabitants have also been delivered 
over to the excesses of tk 5- infuriated assailants, on the occasion of a sur- 
prise, of a coup-de-m- 
The  ancients p' .Ilea against such a contingency, partly by rendering 
their towers indekendently defensible, and, still better, by the numbers of 
walls which they constructed one within the other. The architects of the 
middle ages attained a similar object by their citadels and keeps, or by for- 
tifying the houses within the walls rrhich surrounded their towns. 
T h e  m n t  of permanent internal works of an analogous description, also, 
has caused the surrender of many a fortress in modern times, after the for- 
dr of the storming of a breach. 
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336 TJIE IIII.’J,I: AND TEE XAMPART; 
matkn of n practicable breach, or of one supposed to be practicable, for fear 
of the consequences that nn attempt at prolonged resistance would be likely 
to  entail ; and in the prcscnt century many plans have bccn adopted, and 
very many have been proposed, for remedying the defect that had thus been 
allowed to creep into the science, and that had been found by bitter experi- 
ence to be attended with such serious results. 
The first shot that were emploq.ed, after gunpowder came into use, in the 
middle of the fourteenth century, were of stone; and these were not very de- 
structive to exposed masonry. A solid tower, a t  the first siege of Alagde- 
burg, was struck by upwards of 1500 of such cannon balls without receiving 
material injury. But iron shot proved, a t  length, to be SO formidable, 
that it  was found necessary to sink the walls below tho surface of the 
ground, and to hide them from the view of the enemy. From this time 
forth, fortification became more and more complicated and difficult; and, if 
I may use a very simple expression to describe an imporhnt principle, I t  
grew to be a game of ‘6 hide-and-seek ” between the attack and the defence. 
Walls continued to be, as they still are, in positions where wet ditches are 
not available, the principd means of security against sudden assault ; and 
one of the leading questions, perhaps the greatest question, that the engineer 
has since had to  solve, is, the best method of disposing his walls, so as to 
render them available for the objects required, and to  place them, at the same 
time, out of reach of the artillery of the besieger. On the other hand, from 
the very commencement of R siege, the principal object of the assailant, next 
to that of forming a covered road, by means of which he may approach the 
place securely, is to destroy a portion or portions of the wall which prevents 
him from getting into it. 
In order’to adapt the walls of fortresses to the use of cannon on the part 
of the garrison, several changes mere found, also, to be required. A largcr 
base was wanted behind the walls, and in the toffers, on which the guns might 
be worked. An earthen, instead of a stone, parapet became necessary, as it 
was found that the latter was soon destroyed, and that the splinters from it 
were more hurtful to  the defenders than the enemy’s shot. The wall itself, as 
I have already stated, had to be sunk to a lower level, to  protect it from distant 
fire; and, the parapets and ramparts having been thickencd, loopholes and 
machicoulis, in the ancient method, became inapplicable. I n  many cases, 
spaces gere left between the earthen rampart and the wall, as in the cr chemin- 
des-rondes,” afterwards adopted by Montalembert and Carnot. But, gene- 
rally, a neccssity was felt for a better description of flank defence, in order to 
prevent the employment of explosive mines in the ditch, for blowing up the 
escarp walls ; or the use of ladders, for surniounting them, out of the view 
of the defenders. 
These Considerations were a t  the base of all the methods of construction 
adopted for the improvement of fortification. And in the modes of the 
first writers may be rccognised, as we shall see, the germs of the disciis- 
sions, and even of the national predilections, of the present day. 
The most noted of the Italian architects of the fifteenth century who paid 
attention to military engineering, was Francisco di Giorgio Martini. He 
was born in 1423, and is supposed to  have dicd in 1506. He emplojed 
not only the more elementary portions of permanent fortification, such as 
the bastion and the curtain, but, also, the ravelin, the faussebraie, the covered 
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On, THE FUTURE O P  DEF1;NCC. 33’1 
way, and other works which have since been re-invented ovcl- alld over again, 
and ascribed, a t  different times, to more recent authors. One of his 
deigns, B copy of which may be seen in the second volume of the Corps 
Papers of the lloyal Engineers, contains the ideas which have been carried 
out in the present century in Germany, of a polygonal trace with capollier 
defence. 
They are said to 
have been first used by a Turkish general, a t  the siege of Otranto ; and it 
has been supposed that the idea of a bastion was first given by a square 
tower placed obliquely for flank defence against a wall, in the manner shown 
at K in Plate 111. fig. 1. The first large bastion is stated to have been built 
a t  Turin, in 1461 ; and Sail Michaeli constructed that of the Madeleine, a t  
Verona, in 1527. 
The former has generally been 
erroneously supposed to be the inventor of the covered way. The latter 
claimed the invention of 161 systems, and gave all the outfforks of more 
modern systems. His writings were commenced in 1546, and were printed 
in 1599. 
The first German author on fortification, was the celebrated engraver and 
painter, Albert Diirer, who published, in 1527, the work entitled, I‘ Under- 
richt von Befestigung der Stett, Schloss, und Fleeken.” For permanent 
works, he proposed, in the first instance, round bastions of huge dimensions, 
in lieu of the old flanking towers. His  embrasures for artillery wcre nearly 
on a level with the bottom of the ditch, and were provided with shutters, loop- 
holedfor small arms. After finding that the expense of the enormouq works 
which he proposed to build in masonry, would be too great, he devised 
earthen ramparts and escarps, with openings below for artillery. His cir- 
cular system contained a double enceinte of masonry, Kith cnponiers for the 
defence of the ditches, and is shown in profile in Plate I. fig. 3. His 
system on a square consisted of three earthen ramparts, one behind another, 
such as have recently been proposed by A h .  Fergusson in this country: 
the interior rampart was GO feet high, and was flanked by caponiers. He 
provided casemates for guns, bomb-proofs for troops, and an independent 
defence for his bastions ; precautions, tho necessity for which was a t  first 
exaggerated, but which \yere afterwards too much neglected. 
San Mchaeli also built in the first instance, round, casemated flanking bat- 
teries for the service of guns, in some parts of Italy ; but he afterwards con- 
structed, in preference, low flanks, retired behind orillons of masonry, 
which were rounded a t  their extremities to resist-artillery fire. The fire of 
shells a t  high angles of elevation was a t  this time coming into frequent use 
in sieges, and was demonstrating the necessity for placing men and guns 
under cover; and these two men, in their respective countries, naturally 
adopted the nieans which seemed best adapted for such a purpose. 
A German author, Speckle, published a work on the c c  Architecture des 
Forteresses,” in 1589, when fifty-three years of age. H e  asserted that he 
could give upxards of fifty different methods, all of them good ; but he 
refrained from describing more than eight. H e  made, hoxever, great 
improvements in the science, and forestalled the inventions of many of 
the engineers who came after him, as he also borrowed some from those 
who went before him. 
The origin of bastions is now involvcd in obscurity. 
Tartaglia and hlarchi follomd in Italy. 
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338 THE RIFLE AKD THE RAMPART ; 
I-Ie increased the size of the bastions. He recognised the imporbnce 
of placing the flanks at right-angles to the lines of defence, which the 
Count de Pagan got credit for half a century afterwards. H e  added 
casemated galleries, after Diirer, to  obtain a low sweeping fire through 
the ditches, and prevent the action of the miners. He enlarged the 
ravelins, a measure for which Corniontaigne received praise 140 years 
later. He increased the places of arms; an improvement which Vauban 
subsequently made in Pagan's system with great 6cZat. He employed the 
fausse-braie. H e  proposed those counter-arched revetments which were 
afterwards invented and claimed by DuVivier, Cochorn, and Trincano ; and 
which are now considered to be the best form of retdning walls that can be 
adopted. He used triple flanks, which were afterwards adopted by others, 
and notably by Choumara in the present century. 
In  his publication of 1564, Castriotto advocated large bastions with 
triple flanks, and with caponiers. H e  proposed also a system similar to  
those which were afterwards constructed by Vauban, and were called the 
second and third systems of that eminent engineer. 
In 1594, the first French author on fortification, Erard, de Bar-le- 
duc, published a work in  which he advocated a modification of the Italian 
methods ; but he was far from happy in his ideas, for, in his desire to pro- 
tect his flanks from the fire of the enemy, he rendered them all but useless 
for the purpose for which they were intended, of defending the escarps and 
ditches. 
Marolois reduced to a system, and published in 1627, the Dutch mode 
of fortification, with earthern ramparts and broad wet ditches. The third 
system of Coehorn, who has been termed, in consequence of his eminence, 
the Dutch Sauban, is shown a t  Plate 111. fig. ti. Coehorn's last vritings 
were published AD. 1741. 
Italian engineers came into great request in the 16th century in Spain 
and the rest of Europe ; and their bastioned systems werc generally adopted, 
though with various modifications. They were coiistructcd at first with 
small bastions and long curtains ; and the ditches were defended, according 
to Sail Michaeli's method, by low, triple flanks, protcctcd by orillons. T h e  
existing fortifications a t  13crwick-upon-Tweedy though unfinished, and in a 
ruinous condition," are an intercsting example of thc early Italian sys- 
tems : an illustration of the principles 01; wliicli they were designed may be 
seen, in plan on Plate 111. fig. 2, and in section on Plate I. fig. 4. 
Casemates fell into disuse after a time, on account of their cxpense, and 
the alleged difliculty of ventilating them; and the question of casemates 
v e v w  no casemates, has continued to be much discussed, even in the present 
century. The French, adopting tlie views of the Italian engineers, assert 
that the Germans eniploy these auxiliaries too much; and the Germans, on 
the side of Diircr, ~ C C L I S C  the Frcnch of not niaking sufficient use of 
them. The  Germans employed casemated covcr for large proportions of 
tlieir garrisons in their fortifications of the 16th century, as at Kustrin and 
Spandau; and they havc latterly done so to a still greater extcnt. The 
French have 11ot, until recently, availed themselves so much of permanent 
It is said tlrat the modern fortifications at Carisbrook Castle, in tlie Isle of Wiglit, 
3150 ronstructed in the time of Queen Elizabeth, are similar in plan to those at Berwick- 
tipondreed. 
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cover in their fortresses, but they appear to have seen the necessity for it of 
late years. As an illustration of their more recent ideas in this respect, I 
may mention, that the fort of i\Iont-J’alerien, near Paris, contains complete 
bomb-proof accommodation for 4,500 men, with their stores and materials. 
National character, as 1 have already hinted, has no doubt had much in- 
fluence in producillg the differences in theory alld practice which have 
existed between the French and German engineers on these subjects. 
Fortresses, however, in the sixteenth century, refluired to be modernised 
rather than to be constructed; and, accordingly, bastions were added in 
front of the old walls and towera, and demi-lunes, or semi-circular works, 
were placed in front of the gates of ihc towers and cities. These latter 
came to  be considered, before thc middle of the seventeenth century, as in- 
tegral parts of the bastioned systems. San Michaeli mas thus employed 
to modernise the fortifiations of his own country, but his best-known works 
Fan hardly be said to have been of permanent utility to i t  ; and thcy do not. 
in this respect afford H e  
W O d d ,  perhaps, have preferred to leare his native city, Verona, without 
bastions, and his chefd’euwe, fort Lido a t  Venice, unconstnicted, if he 
could have looked forward into futurity, and foreseen the work that they 
were destined to perform. I t  will be remembered, that these very for- 
tresses, instead of affording a means of defence to Italians, haw,  in their 
modified condition, actually preserved the Austrians, during the past year, 
from Italian liberators and their allies. 
It will be impossible, within the limits here prescribed, to attempt to 
allude to more than a very small proportion of the systems of fortification 
that have been put forward during the last 400 years. It has been stated 
that there arc upwards of 500 of them, and i t  is probable that that 
number is by no means an craggeration. Deville, the ncxt French author on 
the subject, (after Erard,) was not more successful than his predecessor. 
The first French systems northy of notice, XTerc that of Marshal Count 
de Pagan (shown a t  Plate 111. fig. 3), and thosc which have been called after 
thc great Vauban, and designated as his first, second,and third systcrns. But 
this latter engineer, though he constructed 33 fortresses, and strengthened 
300 others, invcnted 110 systenis Iiimsclf, and disclaimcd having donc so. 
He adopted and simplified the ideas in fortification which were handed 
down to him, and applied them, as best he could, to thc different places 
which it bccamc his duty to fortify. His first system (Plate 111. fig. 4) is 
perhaps bcttcr known than any othcr. I t  was taken by his followers as the 
average mode of construction which Iic employed a t  ecvcral @aces. I t  con- 
sisted simply of a bastioned front, with n ravelin and tcnaille, (and caponier, 
when the ditch was dry,) in the ditch; and R covered way behind a sloping 
glacis. He placed thc flanks at right-angles to the lines of d e h c e ,  an 
invcntion which lias generally been ascribed to Marshal Pagan, thc dis- 
tinguished French author (of the seventeenth century) above referred to, but 
which appears to have been due to Speckle, a German author, to whom I 
ham also alluded, as having written half a century bcforc his timc. 
T h e  tenaille, which was constructed in the main ditch, in front of the 
curtain, to protect the escarp of the curtain and flanks, has been ascribed 
to Vauban, but it ras previously invented by Castriotto in 1564 ; and it 
was someidiat after the fashion of the middle flank of Rimpler, 1G73. 
good example to the advocates of the science. 
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The ravelins were originally intended to  protect the priricipal entrances to 
the place, and were made in the form of a crescent. They received for 
this reason the name of ,demi-lune, which they retain to this day amongst 
the French. Straight faces and ditches mere afterwards given to them, in 
lieu of their semicircular fronts, in order that the ditches might be better 
protected by a flanking fire from the main ramparts, than was possible 
when they were curved. The  wantof a covered way was coiispicuously shown 
in 1529, at the siege of T’ienna, when the Turks forced the garrison, 
after they had made a sortie, into the ditcli. This work was mentioned 
(after Martini) by Tartiglia, in 1546, and is said to have been first adopted 
in thc Castle of Milan. 
T h e  so-called second system of Vauban, is taken from the fortifications 
which he constructed a t  llelfort and Landau; tlie third, which is vcrv 
similar to it, and which is giveii in 1’1.111. fig. 5, from those of Neuf Brisack. 
In these he employed detached bastions, with (‘ tower-bastions,” as they 
haye been termed (T T in the figure), connected together by a curtain 
behind them. At  Ncuf Brisack hc broke up the curtain, in the manner also 
shown in the figure, to obtain a better flank defence. The  ideas of detached 
bastions and broken curtains uere published by Castriotto in 1584, and by 
n t rch in i  in 1599. Zanchi was, hoirever, the proposer of the true tower- 
bastions, those of Castriotto having bccn round. 
Cormontaigne and others, after the death of Vauban, which occurred in 
1707, took his first system as the basis for further improvement; but 
Choumara, writing in the present century, considers this to hsve been a 
mistake. It is said that they rejected the tower-bastion method, in  come- 
quencc of its not having proved successful during the defence of Landau in 
1713. After several others of the same iianic, the French engineers arrived 
a t  a system which bears to the present d3y tho name of the modern system. 
It is shown in plan, in Plate 111. fig. 7, and in profile, in R a t e  I. fig. 5. It 
had B ravelin of greater size and saliency than that of Vauban, in order that 
the besiegers might be delayed in their attack on the covered way in front 
of the bastions, and might find it more difficult to enfilade the faces of the 
bastions. There are, as mill be seen by the diagram, a large redoubt in the 
ravelin, and a ditch, or conpiire, across the faces of the ravelin, to prevent 
the besiegers from passing, without impedimcut, by sap, dong those faces, 
and taking the redoubts which are placed in the reentering places of arms, 
in reverse. A permanent intrenchment to the bastion, also shown in the 
diagram, was added by Cormontaigne, in order that, when the bastion was 
breached by the besiegers’ artillery, from the counterscarp opposite the 
salient of the ravelin, the interior of the place might not be thrown open, 
or its safety be dependent upon a temporary intrenchment, thrown up under 
circumstances of difficulty, and under the enemy’s fire. 
Such are the principal features of the last “modern system ?--a system 
which has many serious defects. Its long lines, projecting towards the 
country, are liable to bc enfiladed, including the faces of the ravelin and its 
redoubt, the flanks of the bastions, and, at times, even the faces of the 
bastions. It is wanting in secure casemated fire for the defence of its 
ditch, as the flanks of the bastions, which constitute its principal means of 
defence, may be counter-battered by the besiegers, even from a distance. It 
is expensive to construct, and affords no bomb-proof accommodation for its 
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garrison. i h e  masonry, as will be wen by its profiles, (Plate 1. fig. 5,) is 
only of use in affording Eecurity against escalade as long as it is uninjured. 
The shoulders of the bastioils may be breached from the salient of the 
ravelin ; and certain portions of the ditch, in front of the curtain and the 
tenaille, are unprovided with defence, as they cannot be reached by the fire 
of the garrison. 
Various means hart bee11 proposed for the remedy of these defects, by 
Bousmard, ChasseIoup-&-Labat, Noizet, Dufour, Choumara, and General 
Haxo. 
The detached ravelins, casemated tenailles, and bastion rctrenchrnents, of 
Chasseloup and nousmad, have, no doubt, merit; biit, for the curved faces 
and flanks of the bastions of the latter, the same cannot be said. A 
diagram of the system proposed by the latter author will be found a t  fig, 8 
of Plate 111. The two main principles advocated by Choumara, of an 
interior glacis in front of the escarp, and of rendering the parapets and 
,escarps in certain cases independent of each other, might to some extent be 
advantageously adopted in any future cmployrnent-if it were desirable- 
of the bastioned systems, and may be made available in other systems. 
The latter principle has heen adopted to a limited extent in some of the forts 
which are now being constructed in this country. A glance at Plate IV. 
fig. 14, will show that the face A I3, and the ditch before it, have been 
drawn-not parallel to one another, as they nould have been made accord- 
ing to prerious ideas-but each in the direction considered to ba most 
suitable to it. The  face is intended to  deliver its fire to the greatest advan- 
tage over the country in its front ; the ditch, to be flanked by the caponier 
a t  the salient of the mork. I n  figs. 11,12, 13,14, of Plate 11. may be seen 
the different proposals of the same author for improving the profiles of his 
works, which are suggestive, and worthy of consideration, though they are 
not, for the most part, applicable in  practice. The interior glacis is shown 
in Plate 11. fig. 12. 
The closing of the opening in the main ditch, caused by the ditch of the 
ravelin, by means of largc redoubts a t  tho re-entering places of arms, as 
proposed by Noizet and Dufour, is an obvious mode of remedying that 
defect. The  casemates of Haxo, which consist of brick, or masonry 
arches, covered with earth, thrown over the guns, have already been much 
used, and are probably destined, with modification, to he extensively 
employed in future works. 
But changes of n more radical nature than those above indicated, have 
been advocated by the illustrious Marquis de AIontalembert, and by the 
celebrated Carnot, who mere brought up, the former as a Frcnch dragoon, 
the latter as a French engineer; and it is right to add, that the ideas of the 
engineer were in some measure derived from the writings of the dragoon. 
Montdernbert expended R great part of his private fortune in the piibbli- 
cation, in 1776, of the elaborate mork, a copyaf xhich, belonging to the 
library of the Institution, you sec before you. Carnot was employed by 
Napoleon to devise the best means that he could, for improving the strength, 
and prolonging the defence, (in case of nttack,) of the numerous fortresses 
which the French had acquired in the course of their conquests. 
The leading principles of BIontnIembert mere:-first, the employment of a 
central caponier, in lieu of the flanks of the bastions, for the defence of the 
r .  
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342 THE RIFLE AND THE RAMPART ; 
main ditch,-a method which was alluded to in an anonymous work pub- 
lished by Pfeffenger at Amsterdam in 1698, sixtyeight years before, as 
having been then practised ; and, secondly, the multiplication of masonry 
casemates, and artillery fire. He proposed by these means to correct the 
acknowledged defects of the “ modern system,” and, by bringing ten gnns 
to bear upon any one which the besiegers could employ against him, to 
render a siege impracticable. Montalembcrt thus estimated with too 
liberal a mind the offensive means which it would be practicable to place a t  
the disposal of his garrison ; and he undervalued the effect upon masonry, 
of even an inferior fire on the part of the besiegers, A profile of his 
circular *system, illustrative of the mode in which he proposed to carry out 
the latter principle in that system, is shown in Plate I. fig. 6. 
Carnot proposed several systems, including a circular system, as many 
others,-Direr, 1527 ; Bilfinger ; Franki; Steuber; Pirscher, 1767 ; Schnei- 
der and Cugnot, 1778; Lansberg, 1712-37; Voigt, 1713; Harsclr, 
1719; and i\lontalembert, 1793,-had done before him. His leading idea 
was, to prolong the defence of a fortress by  an increased use of the vertical 
fire of mortars, from which he intended to shower musket-bullets upon the 
heads of the besiegers; and, either to  destroy them, or  to render thcir 
trenches untenable. He proposed to protect his mortars by casemates, 
after a plan which had been given by Speckle in 1589. Secondly, he 
placed a detached wall in his ditch, separated from the ramparts, and 
covered by a counterguard of earth in its front. Thirdly, he advocated the 
use of a countersloping glacis, to facilitate sorties; an old expedient of Ueli- 
sarius, when hc was besieged in Rome by the Goths. Carnot proposed, by 
the frequency of his sorties, to oblige the besiegers continually to  keep 
large bodies of troops in the trenches ; and he intended to destroy those 
troops by the fire of small projectiles, tvhich nerc  to be continually rained 
down upon them from his mortars. 
These were formidable arrangcmcnts, but they wcrc not calculated to be 
successful in practice. It has been shown by Sir H. Douglas, that Carnot 
over-cstimated the probability of hitting the besiegers with his showers of 
small bullets; that, even if hc had been able to strike thcm as frequently 
as he expected, hc mould not have done them much harm ; that, at all 
events, a leather or wicker helmet would have protected them from their 
effects ; that he would have cxhaustcd any moderately numerous p r i s o n  by 
a too frequent employment of sorties ; and that his detached wall was not 
sccure against the distant fire of the besieger. A profile of Carnot’s third 
system is shown at fig. 7, Plat0 I. 
These principles of Montalembert and Carnot have been extensively 
adopted in the fortresscs which ham been constructed in Germany during 
the present century. 
There is an cxcellcnt model of the ‘‘ Prussim System” in the Military 
Riodel Room of the Institution ; but, for present reference, there will be 
found in Plate 11. figs. 8 and 9, illustrations in section; and in Plate 111. 
figs. 9, 10,11, illustrations in plan, of the polygonal systems adopted by the 
Germans from the ideas of Montalembert, showing thc central caponiers, the 
detached walls, and the countersloping glacis, to which reference has been 
made. 
The  German engineers, themselves, have told us hut little about their 
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works ; and they guard the entrances to  thein with a care which dc- wrws  a 
better result than they have obtained ; but other nations are Tell provided 
with plans and sections of them, and have acquired a considerable amount 
of information about them. To obtain the requisite knowledge, it is stated 
that two French engineer officers worked as stonemasons a t  Fort Alexander; 
a t  Coblentz, for some months. The best account of that fort has, however, 
been given by an English officer, Colonel Humphreys, who resided for 
some time in the neighbourhood. 
The principal German fortresses that have been constructed, or re- 
modelled, since the peace of 1815, a~.e:-in Prussia, a t  Coblentz, Cologne, 
Posen, Thorn, KBnigsberg, and other places ; in Bavaria, a t  Gemersheim 
and Iagoldstadt ; by the German Confederation, at Jlayence, Rastadt, snd 
Ulm. 
In the construction of these fortresses, casemates, for artillery fire and 
bomb-proof cover, are extensively employed. By a multiplication cf tiers 
01 guns, greater offensive power is in  some cases aimed at. The poly- 
gonal trace is adopted, in which the forms of the ramparts approach 
nearer to  straight lines than in bastioned systems. The main ditches are 
defended by casemated caponiers, either separated from, or attached to, the 
body of the place. Advanced works are placed in front of the principal 
lines of defence, to  command 3 greater extent of ground, and to delay the 
besieger. The  ditches of these advanced forts are flanked by caponiers, 
bastionets, or escarp or counterscarp galleries, as me11 as the smaller ditches 
of the main fronts. Defensive, bomb-proof barracks, of proportionate size, 
are added in the rear of the larger, and bonib-proof redoubts, of more 
limited dimensions, in rear of the smaller works. The  use of countermines 
has been extensively adopted, and most judiciously so, because, wherever they 
exist, they compel the besieger to approach the works attacked by very slow 
degrees. Each smaller work, and each portion of the larger works, is 
designed with a view to independent defence ; and they are all, more or 
less, combined in a system of general support, so as to favour an active 
dcfence. 
Whatever the defects of the German works, this last principle, a t  all 
events, is a highly important one, and is greatly to be commended. 
A step-by-step resistance is aimed at, increasing in  efficiency in proportion 
to the strength and resources of the garrison. I shall have occasion to 
point out presently, how the masonry may in some cases be ruined from a 
distance ; and that this is a defect which should be remedied. But  the idea 
is not the less good, and is the same that has been advocated notably by 
Choumara, in reference to bastion fronts. It is this-that the besieger 
should be delayed by successive obstacles ; that after approaching one, by 
the slowest process of sapping and mining to which he can be reduced, he 
shall have to  do the same,by the next, and the nest, and so on, to  the de- 
fensive barracks in the interior of the main fortress. 
These principles are differently applied in the various fortresses referred 
to, partly to suit the situations and circumstances of each particular case, 
partly to adapt them to works previously in existence, and partly, as  it 
would appear, to suit the ideas of those by whom they have been constructed. 
It will not be possible now to go in detail into the question of their 
various adaptations, or their relative merits; but I nil1 just refer briefly to 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
M
IT
 U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 1
2:1
9 1
3 A
ug
us
t 2
01
3 
344 TIIC RIL‘LE AND THE I:A3IPAl~T; 
Verona, as having been of recent interest, and to Lintz, as being an excep- 
tional fortrcss of an extraordinary character. 
At  Vcrona, detached walls have been added to the original bastioned 
tracc, with a countereloping connterscarp opposite the curtains ; and round 
towers of masonry have been placed in advance. It was reported towards the 
close of the late \Far in Italy, that the Emperor of the French proposed to 
carry Verona by assault. This would not have been practicable nithout the 
previous action of artillery ; but it is probaJle that he intended :-1. T o  ruin 
some of the masonry toners in advance of the place by means of his rifled 
guns ; 2. To breach’the detached walls, by the method shown in Plate 11. 
fig. 17, and to batter the earthen slopes, of the main rampart; and, 
3. T o  attempt to carry the main defences by assault. 2 shall say morc 
presently, nith regard to the practicability of the t s o  first of these measures. 
I n  the meantime, I may remark, that the fortress of Verona, in combination 
with the other fortresses in its neighbourhood, certainly served admirably 
the purpose for which it was intended, that of receiving, when necessary, 
and giving protection to, a beaten army ; and that, whatever the defects in 
the details of its construction, its position proved to be of the utmost advan- 
tage to the Austrians in the operations referred to. 
At Lintz, masonry tomers, invented by the Arcliduke JIaximilian, have 
been constructed about a quarter of a mile apart ; but, to render the po- 
sition tenable by any garrison but a very large army, -they require to be 
protected by earthwork, and to be connected together by continuous works. 
There is a most interesting model of Lintz, and the surrounding country, 
in the Institution, ml@ has been contributed by Captain Stavely, late of 
the Royal Engineers ; showing the position of these towers, and illustrating 
the strategical fortress which they are destined to form. The principal 
feature connected with the design of the towers is the arrangement of the 
gun carriages, Gy which the Archduke Maximilian expected to obtain a 
heavy concentrated fire upon any rcquired point ; but experiment has already 
demonstrated horn easily the towers, in their present form, may be disabled, 
and horn readily the guns may be silenced ; and the construction of these 
tomrs cannot be coilsidered in any other light than as a great, and an 
expensive mistake. Vast additional works must be undertaken in connection 
with them, before the position can be rendered formidable to an enemy; 
and their destruction mould, in their present unprotected condition, be the 
more easily effected, now that rifled guns, capable of being worked and 
transported with increased facility, and firing at longer ranges and with 
greater accur‘acy, are coming into ordinary use. 
In  the fortresses above mentioned, what may be called the modem German 
principles of fortification have been more or Iess carried into practice. 
Time will not permit me now to do more than make n general comparison 
between the principles on which those works have been constiwcted, and 
those vhich hate been employed of late years by French engineers; but 
such n comparison is, in fact, the great fortification question of the present 
day, and has formed the principal subject of discussion between continental 
writers. The Germans liave adopted principles, as we have seen, that 
Frenchmen have advocated, but that are different from those OR which French 
engineers have mainly acted. The French still uphold the bastionary, and 
assert that it is superior to the polygonal trace; while the Germans have 
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applied the latter trace; and, in thus carrying out somc of the suggestions 
of Montalcmbert, have met with more approval, and have been more 
followed in Europe generally. 
The French, in fortifying Paris, employed, after much discussion, a con- 
tinuous, bastionary enceinte, surrounded by advanccd bastioned forts ; and 
Paris may be taken as a type of modern French fortification. 
At Grenoble, nelfort, Bcsanqon, advanced forts have been added, and 
these places have been converted into vast strategical fortresses. At Lyons, 
the French have also used a bastionarp enceinte, and haye placed ravelins 
in front of i t  ; but in some of their ndvanced forts at this place they have 
made use of a polygonal trace, with enponiers and interior redoubts, in  a 
manner that has induced the Germans to claim them as partial converts to  
their principles. 
The principal defects which the Germam, following Montnlembert, allege 
to exist in the French bastioned trace, are briefly thesee- 
1. A want of artillery fire from ca- semates. 
2. A loss of interior space, in consequence of the curtains being retired 
for so considera1)le a distance bchind the bastions. 
3. An unnecessary restriction to the length of the lines of defence. 
4. A n  inferiority of space for direct artillery fire, as compared with that 
which may be obtained by the employment of the straighter fronts of the 
polygonal trace. 
5. A want of good interior defence, and of the means of establishing it. 
6. A liability in the parapets of the flanks to be destroyed before they 
are wanted, at the later puriods of an attack, to defcnd the ditches. 
'7. A want of defence for certaiii portions of the ditch, when a tenaillo is 
employed. 
The French, also, assert that the following defects exist in  the German 
applications of the polygonal trace :- 
1. The casemates are too numerous, and cannot be properly ventilated. 
2. The masonry would be destroyed a t  an early period of the operations. 
3. It is expensive to construct. 
4. The splinters from the masonry would be very hurtful to the besiegers 
when under fire, and therefore detrimental to  the defence. 
5. Employment in the casemates weakens the courage of the soldier. 
6. The  escarp walls are not flanked from the body of the place, but the 
defence of the ditches is obtained by means of caponiers, and works more or 
less separated from it. 
7. The central caponiers might frequently be destroyed by distant artillery 
fire; and, even if they verc battered from one side only, the defenders would 
suffer, in many cascs, on the other side also. 
8. The other flanking defences would also be liable, in many cases, to 
destruction from distant fire. 
9. The detached Carnot walls, where these are employed, and other parts 
of the masonry, would suffer in a similar manner. 
10. Longer lines are  exposed to the effect of enfilade fire in the polygonal, 
than in the bastioned trace. 
I shall hnvo more to say on somc of these questions as I proceed, further 
on, to  consider how far either of the systems referred to  are adapted for 
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346 THE BIFLE AND TILE RAJll'ART; 
future use. In the meautime, you will observe that the principal questions 
betmeen the French and German advocates, are- 
1. The more or less extensive employment of casemated fire. 
2. The relative advantages and disadvantages of bastions or capotiiers 
for flank defence, and in other respects. 
3. The relative liability of the polygonal fronts, or of the faces and flanks 
of the bastions, to  enfilade fire ; and the possibility of directing these, re- 
spectively, upon points from which they cannot be enfiladed. 
You -dl observe, also, that they have entirely agrecd, in their practicc, 
upon one point. Whatever the forms that they h a w  eniploj-ed in their 
fortresses, they have surrounded their main lines of ramparts, in all recent 
a s c s ,  by detached forts ; and they have, in thcir larger fortresses of recent 
construction, more or less abandoned the use of outworks in favour of these 
detached forts. They hare  thus alike made preparations for defending a 
greater area of surface nith an increased use of artillcry, at the same time that 
they have provided, to some extent, against the employment of more effective 
and longer-ranging rrcapous in the attack ; and they have anticipatcd in 
this manner the progress of modern weapons, and the requirements of 
modern warfare. They have only done so, however, to a limited extent, 
because they mere unable, of course, to foresee the degree of perfection to 
which rifled guns and muskets were destined so soon to attain. 
At the same time, these modern fortresses shorn the general tendency of 
ideas to  be now in favour of extensive strategial positions, in place of 
isolated fortresses of limited extent ; and, when properly armed, manned, 
and proi-isioncd, they will no doubt have great advantages over those of 
older construction. They are  more or less fitted for the reception of a 
beaten army, which may take refuge in their neighbourhood, or within the 
area of their worlis,-~vl~ieh may gain time for recruiting its numbers and 
rcsources,-and which may rcsumc the offccnsive at  the proper moment. 
They oblige the besieger to  commence his operations at  greater distances 
from the main works, and thus delay the operations o f ,  his attack. By 
causing him to extend his forces over a greater surface, they compel him to 
employ larger forces, or to be exposed to attack himself, by superior num- 
bers, a t  any given point. 
I cannot nonr allude more particularly to  the subject of fortification with 
wet ditches, or to the system of Mr. Fergusson, which has, within the 
last ten ycars, excited some attcntion in this country, though I hope to do 
so, in this place, on the 21st of May next." 
111 the meantime, having glanced rapidly orer the history of fortification, 
and having brought it down to the present time, I will next proceed to 
inquire what the, effects will bc, in practice, of these new rifled weapons, 
and what additional powx they will be likely to confer upon infantry and 
artillery, as far as that science is concerned. 
In the first place, it must be remembered, that their maximum effect 
will be made available, and mill be experienced, in the attack and defence 
of fortified places. In the field, there will almays be more or less of 
difficulty in obtaining, just when it is required, perhaps on unknown ground, 
* The Lecture on this subject 11as been already printecl, and will be found at p. 198, 
Vol. IV. Ro. SILL, of the Journal of R.U.S. Inst. ef sq. 
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the range of the objects to be fired a t  ; and more particularly so when thcsc 
objects, as  is frequently the case, are in motion, The longer the range 
employed, the greater will be this difficulty ; and when the range has been 
accurately discovered, the object fired a t ,  such as a body of troops, may 
often be mored out of the way, into a place of conecalment, or a position of 
greater security. 
In  this case, also, the aim of thc contending parties will not bc so good 
when cover cannot be found for men and guns. Artillery s i l l  be liable to 
suffer severely, both from sharpshooters and from opposing artillery ; and 
masses of infantry will be under a similar disadvantage in thc generality of 
Uut, in the course of a siege, besiegers and besieged are firing at each 
other on the same ground from day to day, for thc most part at well-known 
distances, the artillery from behind parapets, the infantry from such shelter 
as the site affords, or from trenches and pits constructed for the purposes of 
attack or defence. Artillery and infantry will both require, and will no 
doubt obtain, better cover in future than they have hitherto been provided 
with ; they will thus be able to employ their weapons from places of com- 
parative sccurity ; and they will be placed under the most favorable circum- 
stances that hostile operntions can afford, for using the. superior aeapoiis 
which will be supplied for their use, with great accuracy, at long, as well as  
a t  short ranges. 
The defence has hitherto had one advantage over the attack, in that the 
besieged liave bcen able to employ guns of larger calibre, and thus to obtain 
longer ranges, and greater accuracy of firing, than the besiegers ; but the in- 
troduction of rifled ordnance has  deprived it of this advantage ; and it will 
in futurc be desirable to employ, on the side of thc defence, a greater number 
of lighter guns ; these guns being now capable of almost all the rangc and 
accuracy that can be desired, being more easily manned and worked, and 
being available for more frequent USC with.a less expenditure of ammunition. 
The heavier guns nil1 now bc principally required on the side of the attack, 
to level the earthwork, and to ruin thc masonry of the placc ; whilst lighter 
guns will be employed by the besiegers, against mantlets, for silencing and 
dismounting thc enemy’s artillery, and, to some extent, for the purposes of 
enfiladc and ricochet fire. Lighter guns will, for the most part, suffice, in 
combination with .musketry, on the side of the defence, for opposing the 
progress of the trenches, the batteries, and, generally, all the surfacc works 
of the besieger ; and they mill only require occasional assistance from heavy 
artillery, when the destruction of any of those works, after their completion, 
or their partial completion, is to bc attempted. 
It is evident that, by the employmeiit of rifled guns of the heavier calibres, 
the besieger will be able to destroy all thc ordinary defences of a fortress 
that arc exposed to his fire, with greater facility, and from greater distances, 
than before. We have still much information to acquire in regard to the 
relative penetration into earth and masonry, a t  different distanccs, of round 
and elongated projectiles ; but we know the accuracy with which tlic latter 
may bc thrown ; and we can foresee, without difficulty, that the aggregatc 
effect of a given number of shot will be materially incrcaxd, for this 
reason, at anything but short ranges. 
Elongated missiles from rifled guns, though capable of greater range, by 
VOL. IV. 2 c  
cases. 
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virtue of their increascd monrentum and greater accuracy, liave at tile saint 
tinic, however, two disadvantages. They leave the mouths of these guns with a 
comparatively low velocity ; and their long axes retain, during their 5ight, 
the angle to the horizon at which they are discharged. At short ranges, 
they are therefore mut ing  in velocity; and at long ranges, they strike the 
objects at which they arc fired at a greater or less angle, according to the 
degree of elevation given to the piece; Their powers of penetration arc thus 
less than they would otherwise be, both at long and at short ranges. They 
retain their velocity, however, better than short or spherical projectiles, at 
long ranges ; and they can bc made to strike a particular part of any object, 
a t  far greater distances, and with much greater accuracy; and, for these 
reasons, they will be able to  provide ;I distant fire of a more destructive 
character than any that has previously becn employed, against ordinary 
works of fortification. 
In breaching a wall at 60 or 80 pards from a battery, there will not be 
so much difference in the time occupied, whatever description of shot may 
be emplo;yed ; and more will depend in that case, if the masonry be solid, 
upon the calibre of the gun, than upon the shape of its bore or  the form of 
its projectile ; such difference as there is being in favour of the smooth- 
horcd gun. I n  firing a t  short ranges into earth-work, or into slightly 
built esarps, the superior shell-capacity of long missiles, will, on the other 
hand, be in their favour, as increased effects cannot but result from their 
explosions. 
A t  what we have hitherto been accustomed to consider as long ranges, 
parapets of earth will then be more easily blown away by  the accurate fire 
of shells, and masonry will be knocked to picccs with greater celerity and 
certainty, whenever it is visible from the exterior. Those effects, also, the 
besieger will be able to produce by means of guns scattered about in suitable 
positions in the neighbourhood of a fortress ; secure, by their distance from 
the besieged, from sudden assault, more or less indepcndcnt of the other 
works of the attack, and difficult to be silenced by the fire of the garrison, 
or even, in some cases, to  be discorered, except by the flash and smoke of 
their explosions. 
Improvements in manufacture, and in the mcans of locomotion and 
transport, are progressing together a t  so rapid a rate, that we must be p r c  
pned, not only for the action of superior weapons, but also for the em- 
ployment of greater numbers of weapons ; and the mcans of destruction a t  
the disposal of the besieger will thus be still further augmented. 
At the same time, the peculiarities above referred to, which attach to 
elongated projectiles, render them comparatively poxerless against any 
material which is inclined at a small angle to the horizon ; and gentle slopes 
of earth, as well as steeper slopes of granite, and perpendicular masses 
of iron, may be made to offer a good resistance to  them when they arc 
jndiciously cmployxl. 
What I have hitherto said, Ins reference more particularly to those 
works of a fortress mliicli are visible from the exterior ; but I must now 
spcak also of the masonry, which, not k i n g  visible to the besieger, may yet, 
when its position and form are accurately known, be exposed to the 
destructive action of his artillery fire. 
In the year 1814, there were some experiments tried at Woolwich, upon 
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a detaclicd wl l ,  such as had becn proposed by Carnot, as I have already 
cxplaincd, for the dcfcnce of the ditches of fortresses in place of escarp 
~ n l l s  The  objcct of these experiments was, to asccrtain whctlicr a prac- 
ticable breach could be made in a wall of this description without its being 
sccn; and the uaturc of them will be easily understood by a reference to fig. 
17, Plate II., in which the experiment is rcprcscnted in section. A detached 
brick wall, 30 feet long at the bottom, and 29 feet at the top, mas carefully 
built in 1823. It was 21 fcct high, G feet thick at the top, and 7 at  the 
bottom. It was strcngthencd by a buttress, four feet square a t  each end, 
and was weakened by onc loophole, in n recess. It was protccted in front by 
an earthen mound, in the form of the cotinterguard proposed by Carnot, 
GO fcct distant from it. 
A j-ear after the completion of thc wall, eight 68-pounder carronades, at 
500 yards, and t h e e  8-inch and three 1 0-inch iron howitzers, at 400 ynrds 
from tho countcrgnord, opcncd firc upon thc d l ,  with solid shot, and live 
shells, respectively. A practicable Ircacli, fourtccn feet wide, was made in 
the wall, in six hours, and the buttresses werc much iujurcd. During that 
time, 100 rounds per piecc, or, altogethcr, 1,400 rounds, wcre fired. 
The firing was continued on subscqucnt days, until the wall was a com- 
plete ruin. It has becn stated that this cxpcriment aas not fairly made, 
and that the effect of each shot was rcportcd to the battefy, to  eiinble the 
elevation of the guns to bc the .better adjusted. But in thc official report 
of it, published by Sir Hosard  Douglas, it is stated, that the guns "received 
no aid, as to charge, direction, or elevation, beyond what real service mould 
afford." 
A few years since, also, some experiments were tried in Germany, upon 
a casemated guard-house at the renr of an carthcn work. .Tho wall to bc 
struck mas 39 fect long, 15 fect high, and 5 fcct. thick; and i t  was 
strengthened at the ends by two side walls, G feet thick, and in the middle, 
by a pier, 4 feet square. It was pierced with tmo embrasures. Thc arches 
above it were 3 feet G jnchcs thick, and had 5 feet of carth over them. 
The  whole was built of clay-slate, laid in good mortar, except the arches, 
and the lining of the cmbrasarcs, which wcro of red brick. 
It was protected by an carthcn parapet, 108 feet in front of it, and 3 feet 
higher than thc masonry of which it nas composed; and it was thus itself 
concealed from view, though tho carth above it could be sccn by thc 
gunners in the battery that nas employed for thc experiment. That  
battery was placed 530 yards in front of it, and was armed by iron 
howitzers, with a bore of 84 inches. They xcre discharged at an anglc of 
elevation of G i  degrees, with shells neighing 101 Ibs. each ; aiid tho wall was 
ruined, for practical purposes, after 400 rouiids had been fired. 
Lieut.-Colonel Bainbrigge, R.E., by whom this experiment is recorded, 
statcs that the cffcct of each shot mas telegraphed during thc experiment to 
the battery. The cxpcrimcnt was not a fair onc in this respect, as the. 
artillery had an . advantage, in knowing the rcsd t  of their firing, which 
they could not ohtain in actual service ; h t ,  after all, the wall was only 
struck by 34 out of 1 12 shclls, which merc fired at i t  in two days ; and tlic 
whole building by I59 out of 400 shells, which were fired a t  i t  in four 
days. 
Iu the \Toolwich experiment aborc referred to, only about one-fifth of 
2 c 2  
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the shot, aiid oiic-fourth of the sliclls, struck the v;all; and, to give an idea 
of thc weight of metal that is required to breach an ordinary escarp wall, 
when it is exposed to view, I may here shte, that a rough average of the 
effect of the breaching-batteries in the Peninsular sieges, as calciilatcd by 
Colonel Sir William Denison, R.E., shows an expenditure of upwards of 
1,000 rounds of 24-pounder ammunition for a breach 100 feet long, made 
at a distance of 550 yards from the battery. 
It mould be,pf course, far more difficult to ruin an escarp wall, and 
particularly one which was constructed with arches resting on piers distri- 
buted a t  intervals along its Icngth, or in what is called the u counter-arched” 
form, than the detached wall destrojed in the Woolrrich experiment ; and 
the principal bomb-proof caponiers of the German fortresses Fould offer 3 
far greater resistance than the guard-housc of the work rcferred’to in the 
German experiment; but there is no doubt, a t  the same time, that a far 
mom accurate fire may ultimately be obtained from rifled artillery than 
was available on these occasions. T o  how great an extent this will be the 
case, time and experience only can decide ; and, in the meantime, the only 
conclusion that we can safely arriw at, is, that it  will not be desirable to  
construct any malls in futurc permanent fortifications, when we can avoid 
it, that are not well protected from distant fire ; and that it will be a great 
advantagc, if, without losing efficiency in other respects, o r  incurring extra 
expense, we can, not only conceal our xvalls from vicw, but also place them 
out of reach of any fire of this description. 
In considering the possible effect of distant firc upon the main caponicrs 
of the German works, there is another element to  be taken into considera- 
tion. Those raponiers have no parapet, or counterguard immcdiatcly in 
front of then:. When a hostile battery can be Constructed on the prolonga- 
tion of the ditch that they defend, they haw! nothing to protect them from 
that battery but a counterguard, a counterscarp, or a countersloping glacis, 
some 200 yards distant from them. The  comparatively low trajectory of 
rifled cannon would in this case come into play with good effect. The firing 
would be accurate, and the projectiles, dischargcd a t  ION angles of elevation, 
would be w r y  destructive. The  inferior caponicrs of the German fortresses, 
and all those caponiers or galleries for defending the ditches of the advanced 
forts which face outrrards towards the country, along a ditch, whose pro- 
longation can be taken up by the besieger, labour under similar disadvan- 
tages; and all the defensible barracks and guard-houses which they ,have 
constructed as  keeps for their different works, will bc more liable to suffer, 
in the way dcscribcd, from the effects of distant firc, now that rifled artil- 
lery cnn be brought against them. 
Both in the French and in the German systems there mill be a liability 
to an enfilade firc of greater accuracy from longer distances ; and the long 
lines of the latter, as well as the faccs and flanks of the bastions of tlic 
former, mill now be open to  this description of attack in some cases in 
which they were previously secure from it. The ricochet of the elongated 
projectiles will be less regular, and Ion-cry than that of spherical shot and 
shell ; and it will not continue for any great distance on the line in which 
the projectile has been fired ; but it mill still be very formidable ; and the 
projectiles will in many eases do more execution, in consequence of their 
not rising, after their first meeting with a n  obstruction, so high in the air. 
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The parapets of the flanks in the French systems will be more easily 
ruined by distant fire, and there will be an increased iieccssity for the use 
of casemated fire for the defence of the ditches, both on this account, and 
in consequence of the greater exposure of such flanks to enfilade or  reverse 
fire, in order that, when flank defence is required for the ditch towards the 
close of a siege, it  may still be forthcoming. When these flanks have a 
tenaille in front of them, they cannot afford low usemated fire for the 
defence of the ditch; when they are unprotected by a tenaille, and are 
pierced for guns below the level of the ground, they will then be liable to  
injury from the besiegers' distant batteries, established on the prolongation 
of the ditches, in the same manner as the caponiers of the German$ which 
have been above referred to. 
These are the principal points in which works of fortification, 3s hitherto 
constructed, will be affected by the employment of rifled guns. The general 
Operations of a siege mill dso be materially rnodificd, in consequence of the 
common use of rifled muskets ; and, both in attack and defence, the indi- 
vidual skill and entcrprisc of the sharpshooter will have an important 
influence upon the success of the operations, as v;ell as the judgment with 
mhich light and hcavy guns are brought into play, in proper numbers, for 
suitable objects, and at  the right moment. When these different weapons 
arc thus made available on both sides, the following will be the general 
course of the operations of a siege:-The besiegers will commence by 
throwing up distant batterics from the best position that they can select, 
and as near to the place as their means of concealment and communication 
will allow, though at  far greater distances, in the majority of cases, than 
have hitherto been prescribed. They will be able to annoy the garrison; 
and to ruin their works (unless they are constructed on improved mcthods), 
from greater distances, and they mill more or less subdue and keep under 
their fire, according to their resources, as compared with those of the place ; 
but they will, nevertheless, have great difficulty in advancing their trenches, 
and in approaching the fortress, when an ample fire of musketry and light 
artillery is employed in the'pefence ; and they will bc compelled to commence 
their works at a greater distance from it, to excavate to a greater depth, to 
resort more to  underground operations, and to confine themselves more to 
the hours of darkness, in their advance, than formerly. 
The  more distant operations of B siege are those which will thus be prin- 
cipally affected, but the later operations will also be liable to much modifi- 
cation. The  common sap, as hitherto practised, will not be available, but 
\ d l  he necessarily superseded, partly by a slowx, safer, more certain pro- 
cess of a similar description, and partly by mining Operations, and hy con- 
necting together the craters formed by the explosion of mines. BIantlets, 
screens, and pits, mill be more in request at most periods of the attack, and 
more perfect cover, with well built embrasures and blindages, will become 
more and more necessary in the attack, a t  the same time that analogous 
works of a permanent description, with an ample supply of bomb-proof 
cover, mill be Ranted in the defence. 
So far there will not, perhaps, be very much difference of opinion amongst 
us. W e  shall further, most of us, agree, that the great improvements whi& 
have lately been made in artillery will require to be opposcd by fortifications 
of R different character from those which lrave been hitherto cmplope(1: 
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and we shall all concur probably in opinion, as to  certain main priiiciples 
which must be observed in the construction of new fortifications, bearing 
always in mind that they ought to be built, not only with reference to the 
present state of artillery and small arms, but also with some margin for the 
still further power which these weapons may acquirc hercafler. 
Such principles apply, of course, niorc or less, to previous, as nell as to 
present and future times, but they have often been too little attended to. 
They cannot be disregarded in future without more disastrous conscqucnces. 
Considered with reference to  the future, they may he briefly s t a t 4  a+ 
1. The masonry of a fortress should be kept, not only out of sight, 
but also out of the reach, of the besiegers’ distant batteries. 
2. An ample supply of bomb-proof corer should be provided for men, 
munitions, and materials of all descriptions. 
3. The ramparts should be subject to a minimum of injury from the 
besiegers’ fire, and the parapets should be the least destructible that can be 
devised a t  a reasonable expense. 
4. The several works and their various parts should be disposed in plan, 
with a view, first to 3 distant defence, and afterwards to a step by step 
defence, of the most prolonged and obstinate description, at the smallest 
cost, when they are intended to  be capable of resisting a regular siege. 
5. The flanking defences should not be exposed to destruction from 
distant artillery placed on the lirolongations of the ditches. 
6. The means of communication bctween the main works and the 
detached works, and betwxn the detached works thcmsclves, should be, as 
far as possible, secure and secret. 
T h e  manner in which these principles may best be carried out, is, how- 
ever, a subject of great difficulty, and one upon which much difference of 
opinion is to be expected. I am going now to ask you to listen to  the best 
conclusions that I have as yet been able to arriuc at, as to the general form 
which permanent fortification should in future assume ; but I am far from 
asking you to place any reliance upon these conclusions. On the contrary, 
I hope you will only receive them as first suggestions ; that you will look 
upon them with great mistrust, and that you will believe in no more of 
what I advance than may appear, after mature consideration, to  bo correct, 
and practically desirable. 
Now that long-ra!iging guns of great accuracy are to be used, it is evi- 
dent that any works to be constructed for the dcfcnce of towns, dockyards, 
arsenals, or strategical positions, must be extended over a larger area ; and 
now that increased facilities are afforded for bombardment, better means of 
protection against bombardment are wanted. With regard to towns, the 
simplest method of solving the difficulty is to leave them as much as pos- 
sible zmfortified-a measure which has long been wisely advocated. Where 
towns, dockyards, or arsenals mud be defended, the additional cxteiision 
required for the works bccomes a serious element for consideration. I t  is 
true that detached forts can support each other, and be supported from the 
rear, at longer distances ; but a t  the same time their numbers will have to be 
increased (excepting where the .line to be defended approaches to, or is, a 
straight line), and in many cases the lines of defence in their rear, or the 
lines connecting them, or the continuous lines in their front, where such arc 
follows ;-- 
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reqnired, will have to be constrncted on a larger scale. I t  1n11st also be 
remembered, that the possession of good communications, both betaeel1 the 
detached forts themsehes alld with any supporting works behind them, is 
almost indispensable to  the proper maintcnancc of such a system of defence. 
The increase thus rcquircd in the area covered by the ~ o r k s ,  and the 
necessity which thus exists for long communications, as well as the want of 
additional casemated fire and bomb-proof cover, and of countermines (as I 
shall presently shew), have a tendency materially to augment the cost of 
fortifications. Efficiency must be obtained. Without it all the expense 
incurred will be little better than throx-n away. But economy, combined to 
the utmost with that efficiency, becomes now a great difficulty, as it is a 
great necessity, of the problem before 11s. 
Fortification, as will have been already seen, divides itself into plan and 
profile ; and, beginning with the desideratum which is a t  the head of our 
list, it  will be necessary to consider how the profiles can be arranged, so as 
to secure thc revetment walls from.distant fire. 
When escarp walls are constructed in the best form, and are backed with 
earth, and particularly when they are built en rldclinrge, or in a series of 
arches with the piers at right-angle9 to  the front, they are then not so liable 
to injury as the detachcd malls before referred to. There is, further, 110 
difficulty in placing the rampart a t  a greater distance behind tho escarp, SO 
that damage to the one will not entsil, of necessity, injury to the other, a n  
objection which has constantly been urged against the profiles of the French 
systems. And, finally, by making the cscarp mall, say, ten feet lower, it 
may be taken altogether out of reach of the distant firo of the besiegers, 
provided it be covered by a good counterscarp and glacis, not too far 
removed from it. 
But by that means extra expense is incurred; and this, as I have said, 
must now as far as possible be iwoided. When an earthen slope is em- 
ployed in thc placc of the counterscarp, that again lays open the escarp, and 
renders it nccessary to sink it to  ;L still greater depth. It has been proposed 
as we have seen by Carnot, and the German engineers have extensively 
adopted the suggestion, to employ the counter-sloping glacis ; but the 
escarp wall, or the detached =all, becomes still more exposed, where this 
plan is carried out, to distant firc; and the advantages of economy, and of 
facility for sorties, thus obtained, are in this case, to say the least of it, too 
dearly purchased at the expense of security. 
Instead of sub- 
stituting an earthen slope for the counterecarp, and trnsting to the cscarp 
alone, we might do precisely the reverse. We might, in fact, abolish the 
escarp, and trust to the counterscarp alone, for a first line of security against 
assault. It is clear that no direct fir0 from the front can affect a counter- 
scarp wall ; arid thc ramparts would be secure from any sort of firc from 
the front, if the escarp were replaced by a mass of earth, sloping gradually 
from the embrasures to tho bottom of the ditch, such as is shown in section 
in Plate 11. fig. 15. The great condition to be fulfilled in a r ry iug  out 
such an arrangement, in a small work, or in a principal line of defence, is 
the very important one of rendering the counterscarp itself secure against 
cscdacle ; and this might be done a6 follows :- 
I n  the same fignre tlie counterscarp wall is, say, 30 feet high, and there 
Tfierc is another course, however, which is open to us. 
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is an earthen slope 10 feet deep, near the foot of it. Eight or ten feet of 
earth, aka, are placed on the top of it, and the counterscarp on the summit 
is revetted so as  to form a smooth surface. There aould be required for 
the descent of this wall ladders upwards of 50 feet long; and it may 
therefore be considered safe from an attack by escalade, when properlj 
defended, according to  the computations that have hitherto been em- 
ployed, and as shewn by all past experience on the subject. 
But it will hardly be necessary to make a counterscarp wall so placed of 
the height which is here indicated, though its dimensions would vary with 
circumstances. I shall shew how hopeless any attempt to carry it by a 
roup-de-main would be, after I have described the other works with which 
it is intended to be connected. I h a w  a t  all events complied with thc first 
of our desiderata, as far as this revetment wall is concerned; because it 
will be both out of sight and out of reach of the besiegers’ direct fire. 
hi t  it must also be remembered, that. even B counterscarp d l  may have 
to  be protected, in some cases, from reverse fire. Riflcd guns will be able 
to project their missiles altogether over any moderate-sized fortress, and to  
take the defences on thc opposite side of it in reverse; and therefore, any 
masonry to the rear of mhich the bcsicgcrs can get with their guns, within 
available range and in suitable positions, mill have to be protected from 
reverse fire by earthen scrccns, or by judicious dispositions, such as can 
only bc decided on with rcfcrcncc to each particular site. 
The masonry and brickwork of a fortress may all be protected from 
direct firc in a similar manner, by bcing .made to face towards the rear. 
Thc required barrack and other acconimodation may be obtained, as it has 
often been obtained in former cases, thou6h in a different manner, beneath 
the ramparts. For a citadel, for a main line of defence, for detached 
works, the samc priiiciplc holds good. 
they may have highcr walls and more extensive accommodation ; when less 
important, they may haw lower profiles ; but they may all bc protected in 
the same mauncr from assault, b y  means of one d l  placed behind their 
glacis, and another behind their ramparts. 
By this method of construction, thc objects referred to in the two first 
headings on our list arc well attained. The walls are hidden effectually 
from the besieger, and bomb-proof accommodation is afforded in the most 
economical manner. Instmd of having an escarp and countcrscarp to resist 
nn assault, a counterscarp only is employed ; arid that counterscarp may, 
when it is required to do so, bc made a t  the same time to answer other 
purposes, of bomb-proof cover, covered communication, entrance to counter- 
mines, and flank defence. 
Any attempt to construct separate works for buildings and for fortifim- 
tions must, of coursc, cntail extra expeiisc; but the two are here combined 
in a form, at once simple, cheap (by comparison), safe from assault, and 
difficult to injure by distaiit firc. In this way, all the bomb-proof accom- 
modation that is required, in the main works or in the advanced works, may 
be first obtained ; and a line of bomb-proof barracks, suitably constructed, 
may then, by the addition of earthwork, be changed into a fortress of a 
most formidable description. In  fact, the necessary buildings are simply 
placed, in proper form, behind the earthwork which is reqnired for their 
protection, and behind the coiirlterscarp which is wanted for thcir defence. 
When required to be very strong, . 
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If, after much 
cspenditiirc of ammunition, the besiegers succeed in destroying a portion of 
the ramparts, the remainder are still defensible. They are naturally divided 
(by their construction, in longitudinal arches) into defensible parts, ana- 
logous to tlw water-tight compartments of an iron vessel. By the use of 
musket-proof doors, to close the communication betirccn them, they may 
be defended step by step. And, even if the enemy obtain possession of 
them, they are useless to him, because, while presenting a flat glacis of earth 
towards the front, their masonry is csposcd to the rear, and tlicy may be 
destroyed in a short time by the fire of works behind them. 
The ramparts being thus formed in the cheapest and most durable form, 
and the flat slopes of earth only, which are but little liable to damagc, 
being exposed to artillery fire, we hare next to consider how the parapets 
can be best preserved from injury. 
That a very large proportion of casemated fire will be required in future 
works cannot be doubted ; and I have shown, in Plate IT. fig. 15, a method in 
which I think these necessary casemafes may be advantageously const:iictcd. 
I have adopted the general principle of the cascmate proposed by General 
I laso,  which was a brick arch covercd with earth; but, where he left exposed 
masonry at the crown of the arch, I have added a thick iron plate, the 
better to secure it from destruction. 
One of the great fortification problcms of the present day, is, how such 
iron plates can best be applied to parapets, now that they have been found 
to be so povierful in resisting the effects of shot on the sides of vcsscls of 
war. Such plates, if placed vertically, and liable to be struck by shot a t  
right-angles to the planes of their surfaces, cannot be espected, unless they 
are of considerable thickness, to resist repeated hloms, delivered, perhaps, on 
nearly the same spot ; and any iron construction of this nature that mill do 
so, is exceedingly expensive; besides which, it would be impossible to 
repair a parapet of such material under fire, and difficult to replace it when 
damagcd, by explosion or other means, within n limited time. 
But, if.4-inch or 5-inch plates bc placed in a slanting p.osition, as s h o m  
in the figure, they will be less easy to strike, and very difficult to injure. 
Such plates ought to be bedded in timber, in order to secure them con- 
veniently in their places, as  nell as (in this position) for the sake of 
elasticity, to prevent injury to the masonry below them when they arc 
struck ; and, in applying them, the size of the embrasure should be reduced 
as much as possible, though we cannot suppose that that will altogether 
prevent the enemy’s shot from cntering it. 
The corering mass of earth on the top of the casemate affords an 
open parapet, which may be used for the service of infantry when required, 
and for that of light artillery mhen thcrc is sufficient space. 
Our fourth heading has reference to the principles by which we must 
be guided in determining the plans of future works of fortification. 
The principle has been very plainly stated by Choumara, and has been 
partly acted upon in different countries, in the outworks and the advanced 
works of both the French and German systems, as I have already stated, 
that the besieger ought to bc delayed by a series of obstacles succes- 
sively opposed to him. If the besieger is able to undertake at  the same 
time the operations required for breaching the revetment iralls, ant1 passing 
n u t  thcrc are other advantages attaching to such works. 
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the ditches of several works, or of several parts of a fortress, then the 
time occupicd in such operations is no longcr than if he were compelled 
to ruin only one wall, and to  cross only one ditch ; but if, on the other 
hand, he is unable to carry on morc than one of thcsc operations a t  olie 
time, and is obliged to undcrtakc them one after another, t h p  the time 
occnpied by him is increased in proportion to the number of works opposed 
to him. I f  he were compcllcd to carry on a regular attack against two 
detached forts, one after another, he would thus, if thew xerc well con- 
structed and properly supported, be detained before them, other things being 
cqual, twice as long as before 3 continuous line of ramparts, or two detached 
forts in one linc. A step-by-step defence, a5 it  has been called, conducted 
in this manner, has such obvious advantages, that it  is only neccssnry to 
state the naturc of it, in order to show hoiv desirable it will be to  adopt 
i t  as much as me conveniently can, and as far as it may be reqiiircd in 
particular cases. 
In  applying this principle, in conjunction s i t h  the profiles which I have 
put forward, to the construction of a fbrtrcss, it  would be desirable, in some 
cases, to employ (L comparatively small (perhaps an existing) fortress as a 
citiidel, or a continuous interior linc of defence as a nucleus, and to  surround 
thcsc by advanced forts, constructed a t  various distances, in varying num- 
bers, with different dimensions, and in differcnt forms, according to the 
nature of the ground, tho eatiniated nnmbcr niid character of tho garrison, 
and the means availablc, or calculated upon, for the dcfencc. 
The forts s h o m  in the diagram arc simple barracks, of which the upper 
story is fitted for guns, covcrcd with earth towards the country, according 
to the section in Plate 11. fig. 15. In front of them, a t  the foot of the slope 
of earth which forms their rampart, arc one or morc counterscarps, connected 
with countcrmincs. Thc besieger would be compelled to direct successive 
attacks against each counterscarp, and against cach line of forts. Hc would 
be obliged to resort to  mining before each countermined counterscarp ; 
and, if he succccdcd in reaching, and bloxing in, the main countcrscnrp, 
he would still have grcat difficulty in getting possession of the works behind 
it, the approaches to which would be flanked by cascmatcd caponicrs of a 
most formidablo description, in the manner indicated in tlic diagram. When 
the lines to  be defended arc iiot straight, as is most frcquently the case, the 
flanking caponiers should be placed at their angles rather than in the 
centre of them, in order that a duplicate dcfcncc might be ensured to every 
part, not necessarily for simultaneous employment, but that, if one redoubt 
should be destroyed, the flank defence might be taken up  by the flanks on 
each sidc of it, and might still remaiii perfect, The parapets and ranipnrts 
of these caponicrs are somewhat similar to  thoso of the other works ; and 
they are provided with internal traverses to protect the gun-casemates from 
rcyerse fire, to form communications to the front, and to act as interior 
defences against sudden attacks, 
The intervals between advanced forts would be advantageously occupied 
by riflo pits, or earthen batteries, to he thrown up or employed as required ; 
tllosc between forts composing a main line of defence, tvhcre such is em- 
ployed, by cofitinuous ramparts. 
In the dcfencc of long straight lines, or of other extended positions, the 
relative advantages of detached works, and of continuous lines, have been 
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much discueacd. I cannot here enter into all the arguments 011 tither side 
of the question ; but I would point out that the adtmitages of lctached 
forts, piid those of continuous fines, may bc most coiivcnicntly combinecl 
by  the method that I have dcscribcd. A continuous counterscarp con- 
structcd in front of dctached forts of this description, as showii in Plate Iv. 
fig. 15, would be impnssablc to a tcsicger, unlcss after n regular siege. The 
detached works bchind it would oblige thc besieger to make his approaches 
on particular points which could bo purposely prepared for his reception. 
Each would present, in itself, a maximum of offensive power and defensive 
resistance at a minimum of cost. This arrangement would have all the 
adrantago of dctached forts ; in ~)resentirrg points of security along the line 
occupied, and a mean3 of safety for thc remainder of that linc after one 
point of it was forced; in being much more economical than continuous 
ramparts with crcarps and counterscarps ; atid in mpability of def r rx  by a 
small garrison: it would also POSSCSS the advantages of a continuous line- 
in being better prepared for thc rcccption of, and for giving useful. employ- 
ment to, increased forces ; in affording perfect communication along- tho 
whole linc, and in being sccure at all points from any sudden irruption of 
the enemy under cover of darkness, for the purpose of passing the linc, or 
for thc attack of any iiitcrrncdiatc aorks of a temporary character thrown 
tip bctnccii the perinanent forts, 
Under a fifth heading, I liave stated that the flanking defences must not 
be exp~sed to destruction by distant artillcry placed on tlic prolongtttioris of 
tho ditches. I may add, that they should not be open to enfilade, or to 
interference in ally way, from the enemy’s firc. 
I haw already said a fern words in reference to this subject, as applied to 
some existing works and systems, I n  the bastion system, as we have seen, 
either the flanks arc liable to bc fired a t  011 the prolongations of the ditches 
,shen they are unprotected by the tenaille, o r  else they are masked by tlic 
tenaille, and prevented from defending the ditch by cawmated fire. The 
parapets of the flanks ore ruined by the cncniy’s artillery bcforc they arc 
required for tise ; and the tenaillc itself is liable to be riiined in the same 
manner as the flank. 
In  tho German fortresses, also, you will rcmcnibcr, that the caponicrs, 
on which alohc the mnin ditch depends for defence, though strongly and 
cxpe~~sivelf constructed, arc similarly exposed to injury 111 all u s e s  in which 
the prolongrntions of the ditches can bc take11 up ; and that the same may 
be eaid of the flanking defences of the smallcr viorks; 
These dcfccts may bc partly tcmcdicd by the employment of flanks firing 
inwards, instcad of thoso firing outwards towards the country. In most 
advanced works, and in all works hnvirtg salients projecting towards the 
country, a flanking fire from the countcrscarp, or from a bastionet, or 
caponier, at tho salient angle, ~ o u l d  obviate thc objection. The Germans 
have adoptcd this mcasurc in somc caeca, and it has also been adopted in 
some of tho forts ill coum of ctrrlstruction in this country, as I shall pre- 
sently explain. To illustrate further what I mcali by an inward, as opposed 
to an outward, flank defence, 1 woulrl rcfer to a bastioned front. I f  this 
were reversed, or turned inside out, as has heed done in the a s c  of the 
main counterscarps a t  fig. 15 of Plnto rV.-if, in fnct, thc bastion form of 
escarp were thus adopted for a counterscarp, then the flanks would direct 
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their fire inwards in place of outwards ; and it is probable that this reversal 
of the bastion trace may be found hereafter to be exceedingly useful. A 
flanking fire of musketry and artillery, in the nature of a reverse fire, from 
a hollow counterscarp, will be a very desirable means to adopt, in future, 
as a protection against assault; and it is probable that it mill be much 
employed, as being economical, and secure from interruption from the 
besieger’s weapons. 
Such a means of flank defence cannot always be entirely depended upon, 
when the chance of a prolonged siege has to be provided against, because, 
as the besieger approaches the place in the course of his operations, he 
arrives, a t  length, by means of his mines at the back of the counterscarp, 
and blows it in ; and, when this is done, an iudependent flanking fire, coii- 
nectcd with the body of the place, is necdcd to check his further operations. 
To supply such an independent fire,*and to give support between one work 
and another, I propose to employ the casemated caponiers, or redoubts, 
already referred to, which should expose nothing but earth and iron to tlie 
besieger’s fire in all cases in which they mould be liable to Le cannonaded. 
Flanking works of this description are shown in plan and profile in tlie 
diagrams. They could hardly be destroyed, except by the besieger’s mines, 
after the blowing in of the counterscarp; and this would, if properly 
opposed, be  a tedious and difficult operation. They would afford miltila1 
protection to  each other in an efficient manner, and they would prevent all 
approach up the glacis-rampart, as it may be termed, until their destruction 
was effected. 
illy last heading refers to the question of communications. 
I ha\-e observed that the use of long-range weapons will lead to the 
occupation of extended areas, and that detached forts in advanced posi- 
tions, which have been already .extensively employed, by tho French as 
well as the Germans, in  connection with recent fortresees, and which are 
coming into use also in this country, have now become still more necessary,- 
to save expense, to delay the progress of the besiegers, and to make small 
garrisons available against large numbers. But good means of eommuni- 
cation are all-important to any system of defcnce by detached works. The 
more these detached forts are treated as isolated works, to be occupied aiid 
defended by a limited garrison, the weaker they become ; and the more the 
resources of the place can be concentrated at  the proper time, for the 
support of any advanced fort or forts forming the immediate object of 
attack, the stronger is the wholo system of defence. The French have 
considered their detached forts more in the light of isolated forts ; they 
have prepared them inore with reference to their separate defence; and 
they hnve made them, if not equally strong, yet more complete on all sides. 
The Germans, with all their mistakes of construction, hare  looked upon 
these works in a different and apparently in a more proper light. They 
have been more careful in providing for their support by the fire of other 
works, and in contriving that the different works of a position should 
mutually contribute to the general defence ; and they have attempted to 
render their detached forts sufficiently secure at the gorge, a t  the same 
time that they may be more or less easily destroyed after capture. They 
have also attended more than the French, in some eases, to the supply of 
iindergroupd, ar other snitable communications, Ilot much more will have 
TIIE RIFLE AXD TEE RAMPART; 
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to be effectcd in this way in future, iii ordcr that troops and stores may be 
advanced or withdrawn as required, to and from the different works, in 
security, and unknown to the enemy. 
The s o - d e d  covered way by which systems of fortification have gene- 
rally been surrounded, might more properly be termed an uncovered nay, 
from its exposure to vertical and enfilade fire. From the latter, its 
irregular form and numerous traverses afford only partial relief; and it 
has, in fact, in consequence of its acknowledged defects, been in many 
cases discontinued altogether. 
To fulfil the intended functions of such a work-of affording a musketry 
fire to the front, of supplying a covered communication round the outsidc of 
the main works on the further side of the ditch, and of providing the 
besieged with a secure retreat from the front, for sharpshooters, for troops 
returning from a sortie, or for detachments in advanced positions,-other 
means will noly be required. For musketry fire, chains of rifle pits, in 
suitable positions, will be found in most cases more suitable th':,i a con- 
tinuous parapet. For the other purposes rcfcrred to, a really covered way 
might be employed, consisting simply of an arched gallery in masonry, 
covcred with earth toirards the front, and open towards the rear. It might 
be used according to circumstances, with parapets, or rifle pits, above it, or 
in front of it, or behind it. It would be useful, not only for purposes of 
communication round the exterior of any particular works, but also as a 
sort of connecting counterscarp and covered communication between 
detached works. I ts  dimensions would of course be regulated by circum- 
stances, and it might vary from 10 tp 30 feet in height. The besieger 
could not destroy it ; he could not pass it ; and he might be harassed by 
riflemen, possessed of a secure retreat to it, in a manner that mould be 
most advantageons to the defence. I t  would afford a good point of com- 
mencement for any countermines to be employed fctr delaying the progress 
of the besieger toward the advanced works in its rear, and, when con- 
nected with such countermines, it could only be approached by the bcsicger 
by the slow process of mining, commenced at a greater or less distance in 
front of it, according to the extent or the reputed disposition of the coun- 
termines. Such a work nvould, in fact, become the front counterscarp 
shown in fig. 15, Plates 11. IV. 
Any attempt a t  a coup-de-vzccita upon works such as I have been 
describing, aould be utterly hopeless if the defenders wcrc at their posts. 
It will be readily seen, by referring to  one of the detached forts behind the 
main counterscarp a t  P1. IV. fig. 15, and compaiing it with the p r d c  in 
fig. 15 of P1. II., that if the besiegers did succeed in descending the main 
counterscarp, and getting into what may be called the ditch, thny would 
then be exposed, to the full fire of the ramparts in their front, to that of 
the flanks of the counterscarp in their rear, and to that of the easemated 
flanking works on both sidcs of them. Situated between these fires they 
would be equally unable, to ascend the sloping rampart, to penetrate into 
the counterscarp wall, or to make their retreat ; and they would be help- 
lessly shot down, or forced to surrender. They would also be unable to 
advance, except by mining, after having blown in a portion of the counter- 
scarp, until they had got possession of the flanks of that work, and had 
silenced the fire of the caseniated flanks on both sides of them, and that of 
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tlic faces in front of them. I f  they succeeded in descending tlie interior 
countericarp, and in afterwards mounting to the top of the rampart, tliey 
would then be under the fire of the flanking works of the forts on either 
side of them, and also of the keep of the work itself, and they ~ o u l d  
arrive at anotlier higli‘nlll, down which they woiild have next to descend, 
without any prospcct of shelter a t  the bottom of it ; or, if thcy were to 
make tlieir way round to the rear, they would there find the rear’countcr- 
scarp and tlic interior wall of the keep opposcd to  them. 
\Vc have now more than arrivcd at  the end of our time; but I would 
say one or  two words by  way of summary before we part. I have pur- 
posely omitted details as far as I could, in order that KC might take a 
comprehensive view of tlic question ; and I will now endeavour to  generalire 
still further. 
For more tlian ti000 years, as we liave sceii, in the history of our race, 
there \vas no great difficulty about fortification. It was onIy necessary to 
build n xall of sufficient Iicight and strength, and to  csmvate a ditch in 
front of it, to  keep the besiegers’ lattcring-rams abxy from it for as long 
a time as possible, in order t o  place a garrison in a tolerably secure position. 
Since 
that time there has been, for the last 400 years, R continual hide-and-seek 
struggle bctnccn the attack and the defence ; the engineer of the defence 
endeavouring to hide his walls, and to shelter their defenders from the 
artillery of the attack ; the engineer of the attack taking advantage of 
every portion of ground less well defended than the remainder, for ad- 
vancing his works, of every opening or opportunity for destroying his 
enemy’s esmrp mlls, and of every unsheltercd portion of the works for the 
operation of that description of fire best adaptcd for harassing the troops 
and the artillery of the defence. Up to the present time the protecting 
rvall has contrived, throagli all its difficulties, to  keep its face towards the 
enemy’s fire, either in the shape of a revetment, or a detached wall ; but 
ic has always suffered more or less in tlic attempt, notwithstanding the in- 
genuity that has been displayed for its concealment and protection, arid its 
destruction has only been a work of hours, when oiice tlie assailants have 
been able to open their batteries against it, or to approach it with their 
mines. 
A new era in fortification is now dawning upon us ; and I submit to you, 
that this protecting nall must not be ashamed to turn its back upon the im- 
proved weapons with which it is liable in  future to  be assailed, in order that 
it may become, at once more formidable to its assailants and more useful to 
its defenders. Uy forming part of a system of bomb-proof accommodation, 
and by hiding itself behind ramparts and glacis, it will be indestructible 
by artillery ; and, bcing connccted with a system of countermines, it will 
be protected for ;I lengthened pcriod from the enemy’s mines. The  h- 
sicgcr will thus be prevented, a t  comparatively moderate cost, from snc- 
cessfully employing the very powerful means of distant destruction which 
he has acquired ; lie mill be effcctudly checked in his advance ; and lie r i l l  
bo reduced, in his attack, to the slowest rate of progress that can be imposed 
upon him. 
The operations before Sebastopol, which are still EO vividly before our 
minds, have been sent to us as a sort of first lesson of what we are to 
This state of things endured until gunpowder cam0 into use. 
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expect from the use of superior weapons. The  Iluesian rifleme11 were 
there most effective, and prevented the allied troops from shoxing them- 
selves out of their trenches a t  the later periods of the attack. Ar- 
tillery was e m p l o p l  from grai t  distances, and, though not with anything 
like the acciiracy that may in future be exprcted from it, yet with very 
destructive effects. Tile daily losses on both sides were enormous. I n  
consequence of the difficulties of the soil, aiid the position and resources of 
the enemy, the English trcllcllcs nerer ndvaiiccd to within 200 yards of the 
Russian works ; and BritisIi troops never succeeded in an assault upon those 
works, in spite of their very inferior coastroction. 'Kl~e French experienced 
by far the greater part of their Iosscs, and all their difficulties, in the course 
of their gradual advance. The Russians opposed that gradual advance, by 
holding nit11 great obstinacy all the ground that they could possibly retain 
in front of their iiatiirolly strong, though weakly fortified, position,-+ 
seizing all the advantageous sites of' that position,-by cmplojing a'' the men 
they could muster, and a11 the resonrces they could collect, to chcck the 
formation of the besieger's trenches. They suffercd SO very severely them- 
selves, because they had not the advantage of a properly prepared enceinte, 
with bomb-proof cover, or well-constructed advanced works, with good 
shelter. Their troops were thus exposed to fearful destruction from the 
allied fire, and nere uuable to be maintained in siifficient niinilcrs at points 
where they were most required. They finally lost the Ley of their position, 
because it had not been made secure against ;L coz~p-c(e-mcii~i, and because 
it liad not been furnished with thc amount of bomb-proof cover that was 
requisite to enable them to retain ;L sufficient garrison in i t  under the heat 
of the allied fire. 
They also harassed the allies by means of sorties, and compelled theni 
to be perpetually prepared to  meet those sorties with troops that had 
almost more of labour and watching to undergo than nature cwld  endure. 
I t  has often been urged, that these p r o c d i n g s  cannot be taken IS a guide 
to the ordinary operations of attack and defence, bcauw the Rub-' wms 
possessed more extensive means, in men, munitions, and materials, than 
would be at the disposal of the commander of a rcgular fortress ; and because 
they had the unusual advantage of free communication with the exterior. 
It is quite true that they were thus enabled to  withdraw their worn out 
troops, and their sick and wounded, and to supply fresh ~ n c s  in their 
places, as well IS to  procure supplies of stores and munitions ; and that 
they obtained most important adyan1ages.h these respects. But even t h w  
facilities did not compensate to  them for the imperfect condifion of the 
works on which they liad principally to  base their operations. Their re- 
inforcements of men were only brought, after great fatigue, after terrible 
privations, and after long marches, over dcsoIatc regions, for the most part 
to bc miserably sacrificed to a wilt of proper accomniodation. Such stores 
and munitions as they could thus add to their stock cou1d not be cmplojcd 
by any mcans to the best advn'ntagc ; aiid it is certain that, if they had 
been provided with suitable permanent works, thcy would, with far less 
advantage of communication with the exterior, liave been able to prcreut the 
allied forces from obtaining possession of the key of their position for R 
much longer period. 
From this point of view, I look upoii those operatioils as affording lessons 
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of D most important character. They seem, in f;ict, to bc a link, coiincctiug 
the operations of the past with those of the future. They mark thc com- 
menccment of a new transition style, so to  speak, in defence. They indi- 
catc to us, once more, the disadvantages of former systems of fortification, 
in which small garrisons have been confined in limited areas with inferior 
means of shelter, and aretchcd opportunitics, to  what they might havc had, 
for obstinate defence. They add force to the old French proyerb, petite 
plcice, nzctucniss place. They point to thc advantages that may be 
acquired from the usc of new weapons in enlarged systems of fortification, 
and to the impossibility, under ordinary circumstaiices, of successful dcfexi- 
sive operations in future, unless such enlarged systcms of fortification be 
adopted. 
I shall not attempt i i o ~  to apply the principles mhich I havc advocated 
to the immediate question of our own defensive works ; but 1 may obscrvc, 
that there are t n o  very important points, amongst many othcrs, which 
ought to receive attention, in order that economy and efficiency may bc 
duly combined in their construction. In thc first place, not only thc ram- 
parts, but also the barracks, and other buildings of an extensive naturc 
nhich may be required in future for military purposes in this country, 
should bc constructed with reference to a aell-considered general system of 
defence, though it may often not be ‘possible, of course, to make them 
directly to contribute to that system of defence. 
I n  thc second place, advantages of position beconic thc more important, 
now that musketry fire is effective for upwards of half a mile, and 110m 
that artillery h a w  acquired the power of ranging for fivc miles, and of 
striking a target 6 feet square a t  a distance of two miles. There arc cases, 
however, not unfrequently, in which thc occupation of disadvantaGeous 
sites is unavoidablc ; and it becomes then necessary to apply with the greater 
circumspection the best remedies that thc site affords. 
I may also point out very briefly the leading principles on which fortifi- 
cations are being designed for the defence of this country. Besides 
the works, intended to protect our dockyards and arsciials from an 
attack by sea, which are to consist principally of sea forts and land battc- 
Pies, with the oemsioa;il assistance of floating batteries and booms, it is 
proposed to surround thcsc vital points by detached forts, such as arc sliown 
in 1% IV. fig. 14, to securc thcm against bombardment, up to a distance 
of 8,000 yards, wherever, not being screened by rising ground, they arc  
exposed at that distance to  such a mode of attack. 
The dctjched forts arc to be placed at central distances of a mile, or less, 
from each other, according to the nature of the ground to be occupied, 
with reference mainly to the commands of the sites which it presents for 
thesc forts, and to their capabilities in sweeping with their firc thc spaces 
betwen them, Their faces, not supplied \Tith casemates in the first 
instance, will, of course, be so laid out as to give the best dircction to the 
guns on the ramparts. Their flanks are to bc provided with gun case- 
mates, and are to bc employcd, not for defcnding the ditches, (excepting 
when they may be available for raking any connecting lines between tbc 
forts which may hereafter be constructed), but for affording a cross firc 
upon the intermediate spaces, and for purposes of mutual defeiicc and sup- 
port between onc fort and another. Their ditches are to be defended 
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by caponiers, one (K, in the figure) a t  the salient angle, firing right and 
left along those-in front, and two (L, L, in the figure) a t  the extremities 
of the faces, firing inwards along those of the flanks. These latter, 
forming wings, as it were, to the works, are new in principle, and have the 
merit of being sccure from the cnenly’s niiasiles, by firing tomrds the 
interior of the position. 11 keep is constructed in the rear of each work, 
to enable it to  be Iielc! in security by a small number of men, and to be 
safe in the event of the exterior nork being itself penetrated by the enemy 
by a coicp-Je-?nrciiz. The circular keep C, shown 011 the right of the 
figure, is flanked by sniall masonry caponiers constructed round its cir- 
cumfereiicr, and is not in the most favonrable form in one respect,-that 
a great nuniber of flanks (as nwiy as sixtwn) require to IJC manned ’ 
for its complete clcfencc, with a very limited range for the weapons 
employed in them. 
Looking to the (spccimcn) profile of those works in figure IG, 1’1. II., it 
will be obserwd, that bomb-proof buildings are to  be constructed under the 
ramparts of the keeps, as well as  under the main ramparts, and that the 
ditches in front of both are revetted in masonry, the escarps in nach case 
being kept low, that they may be shielded from the effects of distant fire, 
and the cscarp of the main ditch being surmounted by a parapet, to  protect 
the clie,niiz-Jes-).oizJes, from which o mnsketry fire may be directed upoil 
the covered way in front. This small parapet affords additional height to 
the escarp as long as it is intact, but is liable to be destroyed from a 
distance by the guns of the enemy; and the besiegers, arriving at this 
point, would find shelter on the c~e,ni?i-~Zes-).oizcIeses from the direct fire of 
the work itself, and could only be annoyed, either by missiles projected 
over its ramparts, or by the fire of neighbouring works. The keep is 
defended in the rear by o wall considerably lower than the rampart in its 
front, and connected, like that rampart, with bomb-proof buildings. 
lliflcd artillery is not yet old enough to have produced a perceptible 
influence upon actual constructions in fortification in any country ; but wc 
arc fortunate in this country in one respect,-that we are aware of thcsc 
iniportant improvements in musketry and artillery, whilst a large propor- 
tion of the works necessary for our defcnce are  still unconstructed. British 
weapons are a t  the present timc’superior to thosc of any other nation, and 
I trust that British fortifications will prove to be eqiially pre-emincnt in 
adaptation to  the particular objects for which they are required. I f  I 
should be the means of contributing in any degree, however small, towards 
such a result, by esciting additional attention to, or by inducing discussion 
on, the subject, then I shall not regret having given you the trouble of 
listening to  so much that possesses more, I fear, of technical, than of 
popular, interest. 
N.B. The accompanying plates, referred to in the above lecture, are 
intended to form, of themselves, a brief sketch of the history of fortifica- 
tion, and to  illustrate, as far as the space permits, the different ideas that 
have been put forwrd  in that branch of science from time to time. 
The plans and profiles have all been reduced, respectively, to the same 
scale; and have thus been made to afford, at a glance, a mcans of com- 
parison, with regard to their relative dimensions. 
VOL. IV. 2 D  
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
M
IT
 U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 1
2:1
9 1
3 A
ug
us
t 2
01
3 
\\'ednesday, N a y  3Oth, 1660. 
Captain ll. G. FISHBOURNE, lLN., C.B., in the Chair. 
AN I M P R O V E D  SYSTEM OF SHIP-BUILDING, AND ITS 
GENERAL ADVANTAGES I N  POINT OF STRENGTH, 
CAPACITY, A N D  SPEED. 
Uy GEORGE K.TOVELL. 
SrIaruLai*En by the recent statements publicly-put forth by the new 
Society of Naval Architecture, and at thc request of several members of 
tlic Royal United Service Iilstitution, I am led to embrace the opportunity, 
now EO kindly afforded me, to contribute my mite of practical experiencc to 
the accumulating fund of information, whieli will doubtless be found ample 
to effect the object which a t  this time is more particularly engaging the 
attention of all matitime nations; viz., tho perfecting, so far as humaii 
ingenuity c m  perfect, that which is a staple of our own eountry,-the ship 
and her equipments. 
But, Air. Chairman, before venturing to  do so in tlic presence of so much 
practical knowledge of the subject (which I trust I know how to appreciate), 
blended, as it is, with intelligenec of the highcet order, I do most respect- 
fully ask from you, Sir, and from this assembly of gentlemen, a11 the in- 
dulgence you can award to an old man, who for tho first time in his life 
ventures to speak before a public assembly. 
A s  I an1 a perfect stranger to most of the gentlemen composing this 
meeting, whom, with yourself, I have now the honour of addressing, will 
you, sir, be pleased to permit me, for general information, to statc that I 
have been intimately connected with ships, and what relates to them, for at 
least forty years, during which time I have had an opportunity of gaining 
some little experience, as a shipmaster, shipowncr, and ship-insurer or 
underwriter. Possessing, naturally, I suppose,. a disposition to try and 
improvc the form of ships, I have been led to  alter materiallj- many of the 
old build, and to design SOMC new ones, long before I thought of reducing 
my practice to  the system which I am about to  bring to your notkc. 
I have'been a close obserwr of the qualities of different ships in a sea- 
way, when under sail, and at anchor, which no doubt has eqabled me to 
effect some advantages in designing, rigging, and sailing my 0x11 ships, and 
which has led me often to disregard adverse opinions. 
I am led, sir, to  make tliesc preliminary remarks, from reading 9ome, of 
rather z sweeping character, made by one of the spcakcrs at the recent 
meeting of naval architects, as to the very little good, in his estimation, 
that had arisen from patented improvements iii shipbuilding, assigning as  
the cause the ignorance of most of the patentees; now it is not impossible 
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t h t ,  with equal applicabilitj, this might be said of some of the objectors. 
13ut whilst I do hope to be free, if not from the full force, yet in  some 
measure from this censurc on patentees, I wish it to be clearly under- 
stood that I make no pretensions to the purely scientific attainments which 
most likely fell to the lot of that speaker ; yet I do not believe I should be, 
in  the formation of ships, much a gainer by exchanging my practical know- 
ledge, small though it may be, for his scientific attainments, for it must be 
admitted that abundant opportunity has. been afforded to scientific gentle- 
men to produce ships, j e t  veq- many of their productions are now found not 
to ansaer the‘ purposes for which they were designed. 
Simply aided by a little practical knowledge of what tho sea likes, if I 
may be allowed the expression, and an average share of common sense, I 
have ventured to place ships, of the form I am now about to  advocate, upon 
her bosom. 
First, then, what I have aimed at is simply this: 
to get a stroug, well-conditioned, seaworthy ship, possessing capacity 
enough for cargo to remunerate her owners, and speed sufficient success- 
fully to compete with the navies of other nations; and I may also add, to 
escape an enemy, even should that be il deadly lee-shore. 
Knowing well, Sir, that speed without capncity could not be generally 
useful, and that these combined, nithout strength, were norse than useless, 
I set mjself to devise a form in nhich all three should be found in the 
largest degree compatible with the other cssentia1 qualities of a well- 
conditioned ship. 
After no inconsiderable thought given to the matter, I was led to the 
adoption of the circle (or rather segments of it), seeing that it possessed 
two of the three things I mas seeking for, viz., strength and capacity. 
M y  next business was to determine how they could be brought into the 
general construction, so as to secure speed with free or adverse winds, 
good steering, and other qualities. 
To help me in my decision in this, I sought for that in nature which 
would guide me, as so to arrange circular frames as to  get speed with space. 
To this cnd I examined fish, and was led to say to myself, “they can pass 
swiftly through the water, hut they have not capacity su5cient for my 
purpose-no room abaft ; nor could vessels of their form carry sail.” 
I then turned my attention to the water-fowl, and in them discerned 
capacity and power, but no speed like the fish, which m s  what I wished, if 
possible, to  attain. 
Now from my youth up I have believed, that the Great Designer 
was the only unerring architect ; and was on that account unwilling to seek 
instruction in any other school--so I at last determined to avail myself 
of the salmon’s head and shoulders for the fore-body, and the after-body 
pf the swan for that of my intended ship, believing that, by their 
judicious cornbinatiou, I should get capacity, power, and speed, with wind 
free a t  once foreseeing that, with such a form, neathering and excellent 
steering qualities were placed within my reach, by the adjustment of dead- 
wood and keel. Here I cannot refrain from availing myself of a very trite 
observation of AIr. Scott Russell’s, ‘6 that a good ship should Iiave the easiest 
form to go a-head, and the most difficult to get to leemard.” I hope I 
shall be enabled to  convince this meeting that I have succeeded in obtain. 
2 n 2  
And now to  my task. 
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ing these desirable qualities, in no small degree, by a process as simple as  it 
is truthful, and which I now proceed to explain. 
T h e  length of the deck, depth of hold, length of keel, being decided 011 
(having regard to the particular service the vessel is intended for), the line 
A, B (fig. 1) is to be drawn to a given smlele; this represents the deck line. 
Having added to the depth of the hold the thickness of the floor timbers, 
inside plankings, and keel, a t  this distance from and panllel to the line 
A, B, draw the line C, D, to represent the l o ~ ~ e r  line of the keel, upori 
which set off the length of the keel, making alloxance for the inten+d. rake 
of the stem and stern-post. Then draiv the lines €1, E, formrd, and F, G, 
aft; these represent the outlines of the stem and stern-post. On these 
lines mark the points H, I, for the fore and after ends of the load watcr- 
line, and at  the place of greatest breadth (Khich may be a t  any distance 
from the stem) mark a point K, showing the upper part of the keel; theii 
with the proper radius draw an arc, cutting the three points H, I(, I. This 
is to form the top of a solid frame-work connecting the stem and stern-post 
by curved dead Kood, upon which the frames forming the hull or body of 
the ship are to  be placed. From the point H, a line is now to  be drawn to 
a point L; by this line the curves of the timbers a t  different points are 
regulated. Tho particular angle or curve to  which this line is d r a m  is 
entirely arbitrary, and dependent on the judgment of the designer of the 
intended vessel’s form, and the particular service she is required for, as we 
shall show after describing its use. I f  it be required to know the form of 
the timber or frame of the ship a t  the point I<, dram a perpendicular line 
from thence to the line H, L; with the radius 31, K, draw the arc N, K, 0, 
carrying it up to the deck line, which will be the outside form of the timber 
or  frame of the ship at the point K; and this operatiou is to be repeated to 
determine the form of every rib throughout the vessel’s length, in a11 cases 
taking the radii from the line H, L, to the curve formed from the points of 
the load water-line HI I. I t  will be observed, that in proportion as the line 
H, L, rises above or falls below the deck line a t  any part of the hull the 
circles are of greater or less diameter, and consequcntly the after part is 
broad as compared with the fore body, where the line H, L, dips consider- 
ably below the deck line. For  this part of the hull, where the bow draws 
in and becomes fine, tlic semi-circles formed by radii obtained as  before 
described are too shallow to reach the sheer line, t h y  must therefore be 
carried up by perpendicular lines to the line A, 13. 
From what has been stated with regard to the line H, L, and the method 
of regulating by it the entire form of the intended vessel, it  will be evident 
that it is only necessary to vary the inclination or curve of this line to 
obtain vessels of any form or capacity that may be required. Thus, if i t  
is desired that the ship should be fuller a t  the bows, the line H, L, must 
be carried upward, as s h o m  by the dotted line n, 6; if, on the contrary, n 
fiuer bow is wanted, the line 11, L, is to be carried loxer, as at c, d; the 
after part of the body or hull being made finer or fuller, as desired, by 
varying the line H, L, in the manner just described, still retaining the 
form of hull peculiar to this inyention. Fig. 2 represents the half-breadth 
or deck plan of a VCSSCI, where the breadth and depth of the vessel arc 
alike, the semi-circles in fig. 1 giving the outline of the one-half of the 
deck of the intended vessel. Fig. 3 is the “sheer plan” or longitudinal 
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section of a vessel drawn to the same scale as fig. 2. P is the keel upon 
which the curved timbers Q, Q, Q, are built, forming the arc H, K, I, 
(fig. 1.) The stem and stern-post e, $ being secured to the timbers 
Q, Q, Q, the frames R, R, of the hull are then set up; betseen each 
frame a solid chock S, S, is fitted, connecting or supporting each and all 
the frames from stem to steni. Over these frames, thus firmly chocked, 
the kelson T is wrought, terminating with a strong wood knee U, U, fore 
and aft. The whole of these timbers are firmly secured together by bolts 
V, V, passing through them, and secured to the under side of the keel, 
uniting also the stem and stern-post, and rendering the frame-work and 
lower part of the sbip one solid mass of timber. The tendency which a 
ship of the ordinary construction has for “hogging” or arching in the 
centre shon-s itself from the moment of launching, and this is increased to 
a very injurious extent when the vessel is pitching in a troubled sea : the 
wave as it rolls under the vessel lifting it in the centre, while the ends are 
comparatively without support; this has the effect of straining and loosen- 
ing every part of the ship’s framing. How, the inverted arch form given 
to the dead-wood of the vessels herein described, and the manner in which 
the entire frame-work and keel are bound together, will obviate this evil, 
or a t  least tend to very considerably mitigate it. A short stem, g, is fitted 
upon the main stem, to which is secured the fore knee U ; it  also receives 
the fore end of the top planking, and g i w  additional strength to the fore 
body beyond the $em g, which is further secured to the main stem by a 
knee A; or the fore-part timber may be carried to form the head, or give 
any ornamental finish that may be desired. Additional strength and se- 
curity are also given to  the stern of the ship by filling in the hull inside 
the stern-post with a water-tight bulk-head i, of solid timber; beyond the 
stern-post the timbers and deck may be carried out to any extent desired 
to form an overhanging stern, as partly shown at  g. Now, should this 
portion of the ship be carried away by collision or the force of the waves, 
the strong partition i will preserve the vessel from further damage by the 
ingress of water. To add to  the strength of the upper part of the hull, on 
the inner side of the frames, and level with the deck, we attach strong 
double waterways p ,  p, of oak (fig. 2); these are carried round the vessel, 
and firmly bolted to the ribs and bcams, and to these the bulwrks are 
secured, so that on the ship being struck the additional resistance of the 
double waterways are offered to the opposing force; and, the bulwark 
staunchions being within the outer frames, and through the oak waterways 
11, p ,  are not SO liable to be carried away, as the bulwark is kept clear of 
the sea when the ship is under canvass. We give to the keel the form of 
a double are, as shown a t  fig. 4, tapering it off at either end where the 
reduced weight is advantageous. 
Having endeavoured, Sir, to show what I have aimed at, and how I have 
gone to work to obtain my object, it  only now remains for me to explain 
with what results ; and first as to strength:- 
Reference to the diagram will show, that by the combination and position 
of the several portions of timber composing keel, stem, stern-post, dead- 
\vood, and the actual crossing of floors with the curved kelson, when 
kneed up to the stem a t  one end of the ship, and the water-tight bulkhead 
and sternpost at the other, that an immense amount of strength must be 
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&hilled hefore a single plank is wrought, every one of which (in pro- 
portion to its substance) adds to it, as do also the butting of the timbers, 
for, being cut from a centre, like the felloes of a wheel, longer on the 
outside than on the inner part, you liavc but to kccp them to their position,. 
and they will bear any reasonable amount of pressure ; instance the wheels 
of large timber-gins (which are not half thc substance of half a single 
frame of a ship), jolting over uneven surfaces, sustaining sudden shocks 
with heavy loads, which their form alone enches them to bear. The 
planking also round the trholc body, like an extra. ring of bricks or stones 
to an arch, is adding to this strength, so that when 911 is properly wrought, 
fastened, and caulked, it is next to impossible to force the bottom or sides 
of ships so built out of their position. Then we gain another very important 
advantage by breaking tlic line of separation at the heads and heels of the 
frame timbers, which, if it  bc correct 10 argue that nothing is stronger 
than it is in its weaIi0:t part, ships of the usual build, so far as this sepa- 
ration affects them, can only bc said to  be half as strong as they appear to 
be. The shift of timber to which I am referring is consequent upon the 
formation of the bottom causing the heads and heels to rise one above 
another. 
But, further, as R proof of strength, I beg to  state, that I saw the 
“ Margaret” (I think it mas on the day bcforc launching) resting, as this 
model now does, on a single support in mid-length, 50 feet of her fore-body 
being sustained by its own strength alone, without the bast injury. I well 
‘remember the foreman’s reply to  my observation, that i t  was “rather a 
severe test.” ‘ I  Oh, that won’t hurt her ; you might hang another ‘Nargaret: 
to  her bowsprit and she would bear it.” This, Sir, shows longitudinal 
strength. In support of general strength, dlow me to adduce the evidence 
of N r .  I3. Beckwith, a man of integrity, aell able to judge and form a 
correct opinion: he sailed in her for about twelve months, and writes to  
me, It is with pleasure I formard to you my testimony as to the merits 
of the 6 Margaret.’ It is my firm conviction that she stands unrivalled in 
strength, speed, and stability. When under a pressure of canvas in n sea- 
way she does not show those sjmptons of makness (by the creaking noise) 
that is usual in most ships; on tlic contrary, she is almost as quiet as if 
lying in a dock. During the time I was in her, I never saw the least 
moremcnt, either abreast her mast, waterways, or anyviherc else.” 
But her strength (as if to  afford evidence to suit my purposes) was sub- 
jected to another kind of test, perhaps thc greatest that the combination of 
hull and dead-wood could be put to. 
O n  her second voyage, being bound to London, loaded, and in charge of 
I pilot,-somcmhcre above tho Nore he managed to get her upon one 
of the sands; it was on the first of the flood-tide, which, setting on to the 
sand (tho vessel drawing eighteen inches more water aft than formard), 
necessarily carried her head-on. Instead of holding this vessel stern to the 
tide, until there was sufficient flow to swing and bring her liead a t  it, he let 
go her bower-anchor underfoot, and veered away cable till it  was almost all 
out ; he then held on, and she canted a little, and moved a little, until she 
was held athwart the tide by her a b l e  and anchor at one end, and her heel 
on the ground a t  the other, the whole force of the strength of the tide 
being on her brondsidc. She was laid in a proper place (after this was 
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knowii) to  cxaniiiie her, when it was foiind that she had sustained no 
ftwther damage than the anclior had occasioned, hy ripping off a little of her 
copper. 
L adduce, as another instancc of streugth, the fact that, the ‘‘ Laughing 
Waters,” when being towed from Autwerp in balIast, being caught by a 
suddcn and severe gale of wind, the steamboat not possessing po\ver sufficient 
to prevent it, took the ground on one of the shifting banks, Khich dried 
at low-water. When the flood made, the sand on one side of her began to  
scour away until (as the Captain told me) a hole was formed nine feet deep, 
into which she rolled, easy as a cask would have rolled idto i t  : had this hap- 
pened to a ship of usual build, is it too. much for me to say, her floors, if 
not her back, would most likely have been broken ? But this ship, when 
docked in London, was found nono the worse for this sewre trial. 
I will, Sir, by your permission, rzad the opinion (on this point) given in 
writing by a shipbuilder of an eminent firm in tho port of Hull, also that 
of anothdr practical man well known in T.ondon, and in Her  Majesty’s 
service. 
Fdwiiary, 1SCO. 
I IIAVE been on bowd the ‘‘ Sisters,” w you requested ; from \!hat I can see of her 
afloat, her form is calculated to impart great slrezgth. I think she would scud before 
the most Tiolent storm; but fancy her stem being so much under must be against her 
going to windward. 
April 25th, 1860. 
BIT opinion as regards your niode of building is, that it is true M the Gospel--Rathilig 
can rqunl i t fw  stiwioth, 
A SUIP’S CARPESTER IN TIlE SEIWICE. 
This, I hope, will be sufficient to prove that we have not failed to secure 
in vessels of this build, great strength. 
Now, as to capacity with relation to the materials used, very little, I pre- 
sume, need be said on this head; as- 
T h e  figure employed is that which affords the greatest capacity ; but as 
some persons have donhted, and others have denied this, I adopted a simplo 
and convincing illustration, by causing two pieces of metal to  be cut, of 
like size and shape, one piece fashioned into a square, the other into a 
circular form, to be measured one against the other ; I need not add with 
what result. Yet, in one instance, such is the effect of prejudice, I heard 
a person, after such trial, declare there was something wrong about it ; he 
would not believe a circle to be as large as a square. I suppose it must 
have been something of this kind that gave birth to the proverb, 
110 that’s convinccd against his ivill, 
Is of the mmo opinion still. 
But to  come o little nearer to actual practice, J i l l  these vessels, said to 
bo so fast, carry a remunerating cargo?  om, Sir,-as 100 cube feet 
is computed to be 3 tori register,-NRI is 100 cube feet; vessels of 
like tonnage, if filled Kith anything that would run into every part, must 
be found to hold a like quantity, but, as this 100 cube feet is in vessels of 
divers form, if filled with goods that will not accommodate themselves to 
every form, it follows that those of most convenient shape must have the 
advantage; hence the very fine lines of the entrance and rim of many 
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dippr-I)uilt ships are. against them, a?d have led to a midelyspread opinion 
that but very little space can be had in combination with great speed. 
With such conclusion I am a t  issue, being borne out by facts patent to any 
who will take the trouble to investigate them. Allow me, Sir, to read ~ o u  
an account of cargo shipped on board a vessel of only 491 tons register, in 
the London Docks, and safely deli-iered from her a t  Hobart Town, with 
which cargo on board’she exceeded 16 knots nnder sail. 
London, 
L\‘orembri* Gth, 1855. 
SIRJ-h21OWd is the tonnngc of the “Laugliing Wateiy,” Captain Lay, per Hobart 
Town, consisting of 104 tons weight, 16 tons liquids, 857 tons measurement, toh l  977 
tons, in addition to which she had a deck load of timber for cnnes, Bc. 
(Signed) RrCIiD. IVEDD Sr CO., 
G. 11. TOPELL, Esq. 
Hear also the Captain’s account of cargo and specd after his first vopge 
in another vessel (which is now in the London Docks loading generql cargo 
for Mogador). This vessel, ‘‘ The Sisters” of Portsmouth, is but l2& tons, 
and only 105 feet between the perpendiculars. 
32, Leadenhall Street. 
JiR. TOVELL, Fresh \Tliarf, London, NovemCer 6th. 1859. 
Sm,-In h s t c  I now write to inform JOU of our safe arrival, after 3 very boisteroua 
pnnsge, but I am happy to say our ship is a .crondeJlt;!l shn-lout; we have been able to sail 
with a gale of wind and 3ve-e ten niilcs an hour, when other ships had to “lay-to.’’ 
We were very deep on our outward passage, having in 216 tons of patent fuel, and 
have brought home 180 tons gros3 weight, Or ab0Ut 1% Of net fruit, which is coming out 
in excellent order. 
1)-c were out of trim coniing home, being afoot LOO > ; ~ M C / &  br/ flte htntl;  this made her 
require her head-sail so long that wo carried away our jib-boom, and were seveib c ! q s  .rcit/<- 
G u t  O i l e .  
Tho ship 1 1 ~  given m o  ovcry satisfaction ; she is n powcrful vessel and 3 wonderful ball. 
weather one; IieIow, in 3 gale of wind IOU can scarcdy feel her ; she ships no heavy 
water, and scuds 5euiitVdEy, 3nnd when in trim is as handy as a boat; slic has little or ao 
p i t c h i q  szotion; much we werc by the liead we never piit our bowsprit in, and yon 
know it stands very low. 
I intend putting 3 false kccl on Iicr, and I believe she will be tllc &test boat njoat, t o  
or off the wind. Wc Iiavc got as much as tliirtccn knots out of Iicr, and I am quitc con- 
fident shc is ablc.to go fifteen. 
I niust tell JOU \di3t she did in tho Clianncl ; we cnnm froin Dct~~fios~ l  L’ecichey IIeientl 
in thrcc hours and forty-fivo minutes, tide against us  cliicf of the nay. 
A fine vessel was boarded off Dungenness lrra h i 7  rind n hnrf DErOne us ; we w e r p  
alongside Iicr in four and r? half. 
Scliooucr “Sktera,” J. T. STEEL. 
of Portsmouth.” 
N.B.-Tliis vcsc1 is but 1% tons registcr; 105 feet long bctwCc11 perpciidiculars. 
The brokers, Mcssra. Kiicll and CO., l’iidding Laile, who did the business 
in London for this vessel, after she had delivered fonr cargoes, told me she 
put out the most for tonnage of any they had had this season. 
These things go to prove that the form is good for stowage ; and, what 
is canother advantage with the merchants who have employed them, they 
stand first for charter, and sometimes a t  a little extra freight. 
1 collie now to speak more particnlarly as to speed; and, that I may 
I remain, dcnr Sir, yours truly, 
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afford myself opportunity to put before you, Sir, aiid this assembly, some 
of my notions, which may not be found uninterestiilg, allow me to put, 
and to answer, a question, viz. : u Why should these vessels go faster than 
other clippers of like dimensions i” My reply is, That from the form of 
the forebody, from the load water-line to the keel, every foot of length 
is making, and only making, its due proportion of displacement for the free 
passage of the largest or midship-section. This I think cannot be said of 
any.other form of entrance. 
In the second place, the direction given to the passage of the water 
under the forepart of the vessel is found in practice actually to lift tlic 
ship ; so that, instead of accumulating about the bows or around her, and 
forming an obstruction, i t  muses a decrease of tlic submerged area of every 
section from fonvard to dead-flat. 
I n  the third place, I hold that, a3 foon as the ship is put in motibn a-hed,  
the preponderating weight of the after body over that of the fore, of 
the weight of cargo abaft dead-flat over that bcforc it, with the addition 
caused by the lifting of the bow, all aid the onward progress of the ship. 
In  the fourth place we have not a foot of straight below the load water- 
line, which, in a sea-way, whether found in the bottom or sides of a ship, 
is necessarily a hindrance to specd. 
And lastly, in addition to the reasons stated, is the fact, that with every 
ton weight put into these craft you gain an increaee of length and breadth 
to mrry it, still retaining an unaltered form for rapid passage through the 
water, so that, if canvas could be increased mith cargo, these ships would 
always go faster loaded than they could when in ballast trim, as n e  find 
they do now in strong winds. 
Being convinced that to these things we owe our grcat speed, I give 
them as an answer to the question, 6‘ Why should these vessels go  faster 
than other clipper ships 31’ 
On what other principle a rc  ne to account for a vesscl only 100 
feet long (indccd not that a t  the water-line), and 24 feet beam, reaching 
fifteen knots, and another, only 166 feet long, with 34 feet beam, exceeding 
sixteen knots as deeply-laden ships, rather (as merchantmen) under-rigged, 
and with no steam-pomcr to help them ; and, I pledge my word, Sir, that 
on the first day canvas was set upon the (6 Margaret;’ wind blowing fresh, 
with rain, being timed by a-stop-watch from beacon to buoy, she was 
found to have performed the distance a t  the rate of fiftecii knots an hour 
under three sails. 
The tcstimoiiials.of many different Imsons go to show a like speed. 
O n  one occasion, after giving the racing yachts a start of twenty minutes, 
with the wind -and tide strong in their favour, and during the race giving 
way, so as not to interfere with their sailing, she came in  a-head of the 
lieadmost yacht. We did not set our topsail till off 
Gravesend, and had but an ordinary crew to set canvas, and to get, not 
to dip, from our own anchor, which mould not have been the case had she 
been racing. 
The same day, being uuder the lee of tlic steamer “Petrel,” that vessel 
being then at full speed, she hauled her mind, and luffed across her bows, 
walked out to  windward, and passed her with case. 
The  ITi~tnes of 24th’i\Tay, 1858, giving an account of 8 match sailed 
I mas on board her. 
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about tllat time, states, that the distance (from Eritli to tlic Norc and back) 
Iyas in 5 hours 39  minutes, and that it  as the fastest on record. 
I have a P.S. in a letter written by Captain Beckwith, to this effect: 
( I  rl1 my previous note I should, perhaps, have stated that thc 1 Margaret’ 
sailed the match course from Erith to thc Nore and back in four hours 
and ei,ahtecn or twenty minutes, I forget ahich, but I question if that was 
ever done before or since in the time.” 
Again, according to 
the Times of tho 15th February, 1854, thc “Great  Britain” arrived at 
Liverpool on that day, and reports L‘~t rong  winds from E.N.B. sincc 
passing the Azores.” 
The 6‘ DIargarct” left tlic day the ‘( Great Uritain” passed the Islands, 
and landed her letters at Hastings on the 1 4 1 1 ,  being the day before the 
steam-ship reached Liverpool. 
The owners of the “Mignon” of Liverpool (one of their fastest fruiters), 
acknowledged to me that the (‘ Margaret,” for several successive days s h  
off from tho roads of St. fiIiehael’a, in consequence of strong weather, did 
sail round her, having her foresail to windward, or aback, and the present 
owners of this extraordinary little craft (the “ Margaret”) haviug stated, 
in  the rear  1855, that she had given them every satisfaction, having made 
her passage from Amberir, in 7” south, to Liverpool (a difficult passage to  
make) in 40 days,-seldom, if ever, before made in less than GO d3ys,- 
m i t e  again, in 1858 :--“ I n  reply to  your inquiry, we have much pleasure 
in stating that the 6 Margaret’ continues to makc her rapid passages as 
usual, and is everything xve could wish ;“ their Captain clenching the whole 
by declaring “ she is the fastest piece of wood ever put upon the water.” 
Now, can anyone be surprised at the character I havc given her in  the fol- 
lowing rude lines- 
This gives our cargo vessel lh .  19m. mlvantage. 
Whoe’er with this \csscl slid1 once cross the seas, 
I am suro with her actions can’t fail to bc pleased ; 
‘‘ Off the uind *’ like a plinntom ~ l i ~  flies from :lie rest, 
But wvlicn fironglit “upon it” die provea hcnelf best. 
A lee-shore 3011 fear not, wliilst she urries a rag, 
For over thc Lillo\\s she bounds like a stag. 
She haa porer lilic a frigate ; speed like a “ well-bred ;’* 
To her canvas elic rucks not, and steers with a thread. 
You can make dlomanccs, Sir, for 3 father’s description of his own child ; 
but it is not to  bc forgotten that, if he mill speak truth, 110 one can have a 
better knowledge of that child. 
t‘ Laiigliing TVaters,” per  Log-Book, when loaded. 
1858, &larch 13th, 8 hours, 15 knots ; 4 do. 14 ; 4 do. 12 : days run, 288. 
1859, January 25th, days run . . 2% 
,, 20th, ,, . . 233 
>> 27th, j j  . 334 
J Y  28th~ J J  243 
9 ,  29tb 1, . . 216 
3, 3 0 t h  3) . . ZOO 
The Captain writes, It is no unusual thing with 11s a t  eight o’clock in the 
morning to see a sail a-head 8s  fa? 3s we can inake her out, and to  have 
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her as far astern by four iii the afternoon. The crew also assert that it1 
the squalls she has made 16J or 17 knots off the reel, and by patent log ; 
that she steered like a boat, and, well handled. would do anything. The 
Captain says, “1 can, now I am used to  her, make her do anything but 
speak <’ he also told me that a little boy, who was obliged to stand on thp 
carpenter’s caulliing-box to enable him to see the compass, could run h’& 
under doubb-reefed sails. 
I have nearly done with this part of my subject, having only x fern words 
about the little “ Silver Star,” lvhich I consider spoiled in order to comply 
with Club rules of admeasurement. She has too little beam to get all the 
advantages of the system. She sailed three matches ; one at Walton-on- 
the-Naze, and two a t  Harwieh. In the first she won a silver tankard, 
beating the second boat half-an-hour. A t  Ilarwich she took thirty 
sovercigns, competing with the 6‘ Oriel I t  of 25 tons, the “ Eva ” of 20 
tons, she being 25 tons ; the ‘6 Eva,” a fine little craft, mas second yacht in. 
This was no day for sailing, as you will suppose, when I tell you it took 
six hours to do twenty miles. This led to a n  arrangement betaeen A h .  
Hope, the owner of the ( 6  Eva,” and the owner of the (‘ Silver Star,” for a 
trial over the snmc C O L ~ C  on another day named, on which there mas a 
fine sailing breeze, and a good dcal of interest was excited: they started, 
and at the first station the ‘6 Silver Shr ” had gained five minutes ; at the 
next, ten; and a t  the last, tvienty; so that her superior sailing qualities 
mere admitted, the advantage not being the effect of a favourable puff, as is 
often the case. The 6‘ Eva” was built by the justly-celebrated I17anhill of 
Poole, and considered a fast yacht. 
Surely, Sir, it is worthy of note, that all these advantages, great strength, 
large capacity, and a few extra knots at the difficult end of the figures 
(for, whilst i t  requires but little effort to get 10 or  12, it becomes quite 
another problem to add materially to it), involve no extra cost, being solely 
the result of form, which is always telling, and sometimes, as is well known, 
is the sole cause of safety, as opposed to total loss: instance the ease of 
two ships caught in a sudden gile of wind when close upon a lee-shore, one 
a moderate sailing vessel, the other from her formation very fast; the 
smallest storm-sails, we ail1 suppose, are all that mill hold together; it 
becomes an effort for life,-for it,’with the safety of ship and cargo, hangs 
in the balance, depending entirely on the sailing qualitiesof the ship. Now, 
when we speak of value, who in all this assembly can estimate the dif- 
ference in value between the whole combined qualities of the two, if one, by 
her ability to clear the coast is safe, whilst the other, failing to do so, 
becomes a wreck, and her brave fellows, who richly deserve more concern 
for their safety than is generally manifested, perish. I hesitate not to 
affirm that a very large proportion of ships that strew our coasts every 
year, are lost for want of sailing qualities. Coasters, of all other ships, 
should be fast, for they are a h y s  iieccssarily close to the land. 
Again, in the calculation for everyday work, it should not be forgotten 
that two knots an hour speed possessed by one ship over another, in a 
passage of 70 days, gives 3,360 miles to the good, and that, to bring up 
this, an ordinary vessel, supposing her to maintain during the wliole time 
6 knots, would require 23 days, in which time the faster one would be 
4,416 miles a-head of her. It is-I fed it to be so-almost impossible to 
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alcu1ate all the advantages of speed in ships ; but look at the bulk of our 
&ips in this respect,-from 3 to 6 knots on :I wind, and from 7 to 8 or 9 free, 
are their rates. Why should this state of things remain? A ship is not 
like a house ; if she is ;I bad-conditioned one, spend no money to prolong her 
existence ; wear her out, and build a good one. 
Sir, these are the elements, and some of the results, of a very simple and 
inexpensive system, which do indeed involve advnnta, ees too numerous to 
be touched upon in so short a lecture. 
May I now call your attention, Sir, to the models on the table? This small 
model shows-I think it will be, as it has been, admitted-that elegance can 
be produced upon this system ; it mould make a very fast and comfortable 
yacht, and, when no longer required for that purpose, be a saleable property 
at  the market-price of merchant ships, as she would a t  any time make a first- 
rate fruiter. I think, for many reasons, it  is to be regretted that gentlemen do 
not determine that the entire outside measure shall be taken (as the inside 
is in merchant vessels) for ascertaining the tonnage; it would leave every 
designer free to use length, breadth, and depth, according to  his judgment, 
which now has often to  give way to  Club rules, as was the case in the 
L‘ Silver Star.” 
T h e  sectional model on an inch scale, 155 long, 264 beam, 15 deep, 
about 28.5 tons register N.X, 495 old or builder’s measure, length of 
keel 127 fcet, would make a very nice little West Indiaman, in which trade 
merchants prefer smaller ships than formerly. 
The  painted model is intended for a 1,160 ton ship.” Her  dimensions : 
extreme length 200, breadth 35.4, depth 20,length of keel 171 feet (N.I.). 
I now come to these models of men-of-war, and I really wish my partner, 
Mr. William Miller, R.N., who has produced them, and who, having spent 
some 25 or 26 years . in the service, is necessarily better acquainted with 
what constitutes a good man-of-war than I can be, could have given his 
own description of them, for I fear that I shall not be able to do him justice; 
but I have this satisfaction, to know that the models are  before those who, 
almost at a glance, can do so. I will therefore simply state, that this model 
has betwen 0 and 10,000 tons displacement ; is dcsigiied to carry 52 of 
the heaviest guns on the niaiii deck ; to be cased with upwards of 2,000 tons 
of iron on her sides and decks, to resist as much as possible shell, and even 
solid shot; and to possess sufficient stability to carry all this enormous 
weight, together with 1,000 horse-power engines, coals, stores, and pro- 
visions for 700 men (fully considered and calculatcd), and to retain all the 
essential requisites of an efficient man-of-war, that would enable her to be 
superior to  any one of the larger line-of-battle ships, especially in heavy 
weather. blr. Miller has carefully, and with deep interest and solicitude, 
studied this subject, during and since the siege of Sebastopol. He thinks 
the improvement of our men-of-war to be more in appearance than in 
reality ; that in bad weather they arc not even so good as the ships of olden 
times; that they cannot keep the sea so long. He believes this system 
may be adapted to all classes of ships of war, and that the would in no 
system in our naval yards would give us very superior ships in every respect, 
way be inferior, not even in appearance; on the contrary, t i at  to use the 
* A vessel we purpose tn build. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
M
IT
 U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 1
2:1
9 1
3 A
ug
us
t 2
01
3 
while it would enable tlieni to be constructed cheaper, quicker, and stronger 
than ships of the ordinary form. 
You will observe that he  has placed the screw further forward than is 
iisual, as this can be effected without diminishing its diameter, and the 
advantage is, that the propeller is more out of the way of wreckage, &c. 
He has also made provision for closing the screwwell (which method 
practical men think simple, strong, and effective) with slides working in a 
metal case, which are intended to be flush with the outside planking (not 
as seen in the model, which merely exemplifies its working). The  slldes 
have a .rack fixed to their upper surface, which is acted upon by a bevel 
pinion wheel, worked by one man by means of a vertical shaft passing 
throngh a stuffing-box on the orlop-deck; its object is to prevent the drag 
of dead-xater impeding the speed of the ship. 
From experience, I find that vessels of the form I advocate will carry 
thcir weight higher up than those of ordinary build possessing the sanie 
length and breadth ; that they sail much faster and steer better, are first- 
rate bad-weather ships, and will scud in heavy weather, and ride, or lie-to, 
admirably. 
They are wry easy of construction, capacious, and strong. 
They require less curve in their timber, and less timber to  obtain the 
same space ; less labour is required to bend the planks into shape, a id  steam 
is not wanted ; for which reasons this form costs less. 
Surely these are advantages ; and whenever private gentlemen, or those 
on whom the heavy, and I may add unenviable, responsibility devolves, of 
deciding for national purposes what is best, shall desire, I can only say for 
myself andmy partner, Mr. William Miller, that we shall be happy to afford 
them the opportunity to avail themselves of them. 
The price of ships, like most other things, varies with what affects the 
value of the materials they are constructed of, and that of labour ; but I 
affirm, without fear of contradiction, that 100 cube feet, or a ton regis- 
ter,’’ which everybody can understand, c3n be produced by this system as 
cheaply as  by any other. In thus speaking I am safe, for I believe it has 
been produced for less. 
I have only further to tax yom patience, Sir, 11y stating, that, without ex- 
ception, all the gentlemen who have tried the system arc satisfied ; and, as n 
proof, one or two of thcm have come forward with some others to open R 
yard to promote the building and more general use of ships built on this 
principle, and this yard I do hope, cro this suminer passes away, to see in 
full operatiou ; n-e now only require the patronage of a few more gentlemen, 
thus to  promote, not only what bids fair to be a more than self-supporting 
system of improvements in ships, but one that would confer oiishiponners, 
merchants, underwriters, and Inst, though not least, sailors, ;I real benefit. 
In conclusion, 1 most sincerely thank you, Sir, and the Gcntlcmen who, 
with yourself, have done me the honour of so patiently listening to my very 
homely remarks and explanations. 
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